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A.  Introduction 
The  Com~ission decided on  6 July 1976  to draw  up  a  regulation based 
on  Article  235  1)  creating a  Community  trade mark  and  a  directive based on 
Article  100  approximating national trade mark  law.  At  the same  time it 
prepared and published a  memorandum  setting out  the  reasons for these  ) 
measures  and describing the work  that  had gone  into their preparation2  • 
During the  discussions  concerning the memorandum  and  the first 
and  second draft versions of the  regulation,  the  question whether  the 
Community  was  competent  to take  legislative  (and administrative) measures 
in the  trade mark  sphere was  raised several times.  It was  asked in particular 
whether it is legally possible and,  if so,  whether it is necessary to create 
the  Community  trade mark  and the Trade Marks  Office by means  of a  Community 
regulation. 
The  reasons why  the  Commission  is proposing action  in the field of 
trade marks  are as  follows.  The  common  market in marked  goods  is extremely 
underdeveloped compared with the internal markets  in other products.  Even 
today,  the  only trade marks  in existence are national ones.  The  extent to 
which they are protected is determined by national  law  and  the  protection 
available is effective only within the area over which  the  relevant national 
law  operates.  The  protection afforded to trade marks  in one  Member  State 
does  not,  as  a  rule,  extend over the frontiers of the other Member  States. 
Conversely,  from  the standpoint of any given national  law,  the  protection of 
marks  which is available abroad does not  extend into the  area of  jurisdiction 
of that law.  Identical or similar trade marks  can  therefore  be  protected 
in more  than  one  Member  State for the benefit of different proprietors.  As 
a  result,  conflicts inevitably arise at the  Community's  internal frontiers. 
Each  proprietor has  exclusive rights.  Consumers  in the neighbouring country 
may  be misled as  to the origin of the product.  A trade mark  is, after all, 
protected not for its own  sake but for the purpose  of identifying goods  and 
services.  Importation of goods  and  services may  thus be  impeded by trade 
mark  rights,  and free  trade  and compeition between Member  States can be 
affected thereby. 
Consequently,  ever since  the EEC  Treaty entered into force  a  solution 
has been sought  to the  problem  of overcoming the barriers created by national 
trade mark  rights.  Certain  judgments  of the  Court  of.  Justice of the European 
Communities  have  in the meantime  removed  some  of the rules which  inhibited 
tFade.  In particular,  the proprietor of a  trade mark  is no  longer entitled 
to prohibit  a  third party from  using the mark  in respect of goods  which  have 
been marketed under it in another Member  State by the  proprietor himself or 
with his consent.  In  the  absence  of legislative measures at Community  level, 
the  Court  of Justice felt it necessary to  pronounce  further  judgments 
supporting the free movement  of marked goods.  From  the point of view of trade 
mark  protection,  the future  is· dangerous  if the  Community  does not  adopt 
legislation forthwith. 
.;. 
1 )  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  the articles referred to  in this paper are 
those  of the  Treaty establishing the European  Economic  Community. 
2)  Memorandum  on  the creation of an  EEC  trade mark,  Bulletin of the European 
Communities,  Supplement  8/76. - 4 -
The  fact is,  however,  that most  of the obstacles to the free  movement 
of goods  which are  created by trade mark  laws  remain with us still.  This 
can be  seen particularly in innumerable  cases  in which  confusingly similar 
trade marks  which have  developed independently of one  another in different 
Member  States are  owned  by firms  which  have  no  business connection with each 
other. 
It is essential,  therefore,  to harmonise  those  prov1s1ons  of national 
trade mark  law  which directly affect the free  movement  of goods  and services 
and  freedom  of  competition  in the  Community.  These  are for the most  part rules 
concerning the  extent  of the  protection afforded to trade marks,  their use, 
the  amicable  settlement of disputes arising out of conflict between  trade marks, 
and the  grounds  for cancellation.  A draft  proposal  f~r a  Directive to  harmonise 
the  laws  on  trade marks  is currently being discussed1). 
The  harmonisation of national  lawscan  reduce  the  number  of trade mark 
ronflicts,  which,  after all are prejudicial to the  common  market but it 
cannot  eliminate their underlying cause.  Harmonisation of the national  systems of 
trade mark  protection cannot in any way  affect the restraints upon  inter-State 
trade which arise because  the national systems of law are  autonomous  and 
because  the  laws  of the Member  States are  founded  on  the  principle of 
territoriality.  So  long as national trade mark  laws  exist,  their 
geographical area of application will remain  limited within each Member  State 
with the  result that,  even after harmonisation,  numerous  sources of conflict, 
both old and new,  between identical or similar trade marks  governed by different 
legal systems,  will continue  to exist.  Where  the domestic  laws relating to 
trade marks  so  allow,  a  number  of persons  who  are  independent of each other can 
obtain protection of the  same  mark,  or of similar marks,  in different Member 
States and thereby prevent the  importation of the  relevant  goods  into their 
country. 
These  conflicts are an  impediment  to the free movement  of goods  and 
to  competition,  and they are detrimental to the  proprietors of trade marks 
and to  consumers.  The  only way  in which  they can be  eliminated is by making 
trade mark  protection co-extensive with the  area of the  common  market.  It will 
have  to  be  possible  to  obtain  a  mark  which  is entirely independent of national 
laws  on  trade marks  and which is valid throughout  the  Community.  Since national 
trade mark  protection  can  be neither abolished nor  compulsorily changed into 
Community  protection,  the  creation of a  Community  trade mark existing alongside 
national rights is the  onl:.r  means  whereby  a  common  market  in marked  goods  can 
eventually be  achieved. 
Trade  and  industry both within  and outside  the  Community  have  declared 
themselves  overwhelmingly in favour of the  creation of this new  right  which  is 
to extend over the whole  area of the  Community.  They  expect  to  gain  substantially 
from  its use.  National trade mark  law  has,  of course,  proved throughout  the world 
to be  an  essential factor in promoting trade  and industry.  All the  indications 
are that a  Community  trade mark  system will provide  the  same  impetus and produce 
the  same  consequences.  The  production of and trade in marked goods  account .for a 
.j. 
!)Draft Proposal for  a  Council  Directive  to  harmonise  the  trade mark  laws of 
the Member  States,  Document  III/D/1293/79 of July 1979. -5-
large  part .of the  Community's  economic  activity.  Business  development,  economic 
expansion  and  the  standard of  living of consumers  in the  Community  depend 
to  some  extent  on  the profitability,  capital expenditure,  growth  and 
international competitiveness of commerce  and  industry in  producing and 
trading in marked  goods.  The  introduction of the mark  at  Community  level 
will  open  up new  and additional  channels of economic  activity.  It will make 
possible the  development  of new  European markets for new  products  and  services 
and the  expansion  of existing national markets  into  ~1ropean ones.  The  mark 
will thus  operate as  an  important  integrating factor.  As  a  result of the 
Community  trade mark,  moreover,  undertakings will not  have  to acquire  a  range 
of national marks  with the different procedures,  higher costs and  increased 
work-load that this involves.  Lastly,  the  Community  trade mark  will have 
real  economic  significance for  the  consumer.  It will  increase  the  transparency 
of  ~1ropean markets,  simplify choice  and aid decision-making. 
For  these reasons,  the  Community  ought not  to  remain inactive. 
B.  Main  features  of the  draft  regulation 
The  draft regulation1)  of  1978  proposes  inter alia the following 
substantive trade mark  law: 
the acquisition,  by means  of registration,  of trade marks  for  goods  or 
services,  which  marks  are  to be  operative throughout  the  whole  area of 
the  Community  (Articles  1  and  6  of the  draft); 
registration of a  Community  trade mark  and its maintenance  only where  no 
prior trade mark  rights exis·t  in any of the Member  States  (Articles 8  and  51); 
the obligation to use  a  Cowrunity trade mark  (Article 9); 
determination of the  extent  of the  protection afforded by a  Community 
trade mark  (Articles  10,  12,  13  and  14); 
the  Community  trade mark,  as an  item of property,  is to be  treated. in the 
same  way  as  a  national trade mark  (Article  19); 
transfer of a  Community  trade mark will operate over  the whole  area of the 
Community,  but not  over  a  lesser area  (Article  20); 
after a  certain period of time  the validity of a  Community  mark  cannot  be 
contested  (Article  55). 
For purposes of the  application. of this substantive  law  the  draft 
regulation provides for  a  number  of official procedures,  namely,  registration 
(Title  IV),  renewal,  surrender,  lapse,  cancellation (Title V)o  Title VI  and 
VII  govern  legal protection.  Title VIII governs  jurisdiction and  the  procedure 
to be  followed  in actions relating to  Community  trade marks. 
1)  Draft  Council  Regulation  on  the  Community  trade  ~ark,  document 
III/D/753/78 of July 1978. - 6-. 
For the  implementation of these official procedures,  the 
regulation proposes  the  creation of a  Community  Trade Mark  Office  and 
specifies the  functions,legal status and organisation thereof and also  its 
relationship to  the  Community  institutions.  The  Office's function is to 
apply the  procedures  prescribed by the  regulation  (Article  2  of the draft). 
To  help it perform this function,  the  Office is to have a  legal personality 
(Article 118(1)).  In all the Member  States it is to enjoy the widest  legal 
capacity available to  legal persons  who  are subject to their laws  (Article 
118(2)).  The  fact  that the  Office is to have  such  legal personality,  or 
legal capacity in national  laws,  does not mean  that it is also to enjoy 
legal capacity in public international  law.  On  the contrary,  it follows 
from  the nature  of its function  and  powers,  as described above,  that it 
will not  have  capacity for purposes  of international  law.  Under  the  terms of 
the  draft,  the Office will not have  power  to conclude  international agreements. 
Moreover,  it is given no  privileges  and  immunities of its own.  Instead,  those 
of the  Community  are  declared to be  applicable to it (Article  121). 
The  Trade Mark  Office is to  enjoy certain rights  and  be  placed under 
various obligations.  Thus  it will have  power  to address  decisions to 
interested parties on  the following matters: 
refusal  to register the  transfer of a  Community  trade mark  (Article 20(4)); 
dismissal of an application for a  Community  trade mark  (Articles31,  32 
and 41 ); 
dismissal of the opposition of the proprietor of an  earlier trade mark 
(Article 40(2)); 
~ registration of a  Community  trade mark,  renewal  of registration  (Articles 
42·  and 43); 
registration of the  surrender of a  Community  trade mark  (Article 44); 
declaration of the  lapse of a  Community  trade mark  (Article  62); 
declaration of invalidity of a  Community  trade mark  (Article  62); 
fixing of the  amount  of costs  of opposition,  lapse or cancellation proceedings 
(Article  80); 
decisions  in respect of appeals  (Article  68); 
restitutio in  integrum  (Article 77(4)). 
The  regulation  confers  the  following powers,  in particular,  on  the 
Commission: 
appointment  and  dismissal of senior staff offue Office  (Article  126); 
-supervision of the  legality of the acts of the  President  (Article  127(1)); 
hearing of complaints from  a  Member  State or interested party concerning 
the  alleged illegality of an  act of the  President  (Article  127(3)); 
adoption of amendments  to the  implementing regulations  (Article  142(3))  • 
.  ;. - 7-
The  following powers  are  to be  conferred on  the  Court  of Justice: 
hearing of further appeals  ("in the interest of the parties")  lodged by 
parties who  are adversely affected by decisions of the  Board of Appeal  of the  Office 
on  grounds of infringement of an  essential procedural  requirement  and of 
infringement  of the regulation or any rule of law  relating to its application 
(Article  69); 
hearing of further appeals  on  a  point of law  lodged by the  Advocate-General 
at the  Court  of Justice against decisions of the  Board of Appeal  of the 
Office on  grounds  of infringement of an  essential procedural  requirement 
and of infringement of the regulation or any rule of  law  relating to  its 
application  (Article 70); 
the giving of  judgment  pursuant  to any arbitration clause  contained in a 
contract  concluded by the  Office  (Article  122(2)); 
the  giving of  judgment  in disputes relating to  compensation  for damage  in 
the  case of the non-contractual  liability of the Office  (Article  122(3)  and 
(4)); 
the  giving of  judgment  in disputes between  the  Office  and its staff 
(Article  124): 
The  Council  is to be  granted the  power  to  adopt  implementing 
provisions as  follows  (Article  142): 
the  implementing regulations; 
the  rules of procedure of the  Boards  of Appeal  of the Trade Mark  Office; 
the rules relating to fees;  and 
the Staff Regulations 
c.  Competence  of the  Community  in relation to trade marks 
I. The  tasks entrusted to the  Community 
Article 4(I) distinguishes between  "the tasks entrusted to  the 
Community"  (first sentence)  and "the  powers  conferred" upon  its institutions 
to carry out  these tasks  (second sentence).  Consequently  1  the  competence  of 
the  Community  deriving from  its tasks must  be  considered first of all. 
The  competence  of the  Community  is not  described by means  of an 
exhaustive list of fields  of operation but is rather more  widely determined 
by the  Community  tasks,  objectives and activities which  are laid  do\~ as 
binding by the  Treaty,  particularly in Articles  2  and  3. 
Article  2  provides  that "the  Conununity  shall have  as its task" to 
promote  the  Community  objectives referred to therein,  that is,  inter alia, 
a  harmonious  development  of economic activities throughout  the  Community, 
a  continuous  and balanced expansion,  and  ru1  accelerated raising of the 
standard of living.  The  Community  also  has  to promote  these objectives  in 
the field of goods  and services marketed under trade marks.  Article  2  covers 
every economic  activity including the  production of marked  goods  and their 
use  by purchasers  and consumers. 
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Article  2  also provides that "the  Community"  is to  promote  these 
salient economic  and social objectives by,  inter alia,  establishing a  common 
market.  According to the Treaty,  the  concept of a  common  market  covers all 
goods  and services irrespective of whether  they are marketed under a  trade 
mark  or not. 
Article  3 provides  that these  objectives are to be  attained through 
"the activities of the  Community".  These  activities include: 
the abolition,  as  between Member  States,  of obstacles to freedom  of 
movement  for  goods  and  services  (Article  3  (a)  and  (c);  · 
the establishment of a  common  customs tariff and of a  common  commercial 
policy towards  third countries  (Article  3  (b)); 
the institution of a  system  ensuring that competition in the  common  market 
is not  distorted (Article  3  (f));  and 
the approximation of the  laws  of Member  States to the extent required for the 
proper functioning of the  common  market  (Article  3  (h)). 
Article  3  likewise contains no  restrictions  regarding the  goode  and 
services covered;  it consequently covers  them  all.  The  Community's  activities 
therefore extend eo  far as  to  cover goods  and  services marketed under a  trade 
mark.  Thus  marked goods fall within the  scope  of the  customs  union established 
by the  Community.  They also fall within the scope  of the  common  commercial 
policy which  the  Community  is gradually developing towards third countries. 
Moreover,  they must  be  able  to circulate freely within the  Community  and 
the  Community  must  also institute a  system  ensuring that competition in the 
Community  is not distorted in the case of trade marks. 
The  same  applies  to  the national legal provisions  in question.  Article 
3  does not  contain any restrictions in this respect either;  it therefore  covers 
them  all  so far as is necessary for the  operation of the  common  market.  The 
Community's  "activities" therefore  extend  so  far as to  cover the  trade mark 
law  of the Member  States.  As  in the  case  of goods  and services which  are not 
marketed under  trade marks,  the  Community's  "activities11  are not restricted 
to executive or supervisory measures  in individual cases,  but  cover legislative, 
including organizational,  measures  ("institution of a  system"). 
II. Meaning  of Article  36 
Does  Article  36 ·in any way  alter this  law-making  pov1er  of the 
Community?  Under  the Treaty provisions  on  the  free movement  of goods,  in 
particular Article  30,  quantitative restrictions  on  imports  and all measures 
having equivalent  effect are prohibited between Member  States.  Article  36 
stipulates,  however,  that these  provisions  do  not  preclude  (inter alia) 
prohibitions of or restrictions on  imports  justified on  grounds of the  protection 
of trade mark  rights.  Does  Article  36  also  limit the  scope  of Articles  100 
and  235?  Article  36  provides that: 
.;. -9-
"The  provisions of Articles  30  to  34  shall not  preclude  prohibi  tiona or 
restrictions on  imports,  exports or goods  in transit  justified on  grounds 
of public morality,  public policy or public security;  the  protection of 
health and  life of humans,  animals or plants;  the  protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value;  or the 
protection of industrial and commercial  property.  Such  prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not,  however,  constitute a  means  of arbitrary discrimination 
or a  disguised restriction on  trade between Member  States." 
Two  conclusions  can be  drawn  from  this wording,  bearing in mind  that 
it mentions only Articles  30  to 34,  and  taking account  of the fact  that 
Article  36  is contained in the Title "Free movement  of goods"  and appears 
at the  end of Chapter  2  (together with Article 37).  First,  the first sentence 
relates exclusively to  those national provisions of trade mark  law which 
impose  restrictions on  the free movement  of goods.  No  other provisions  are 
involved.  Secondly,  the first sentence  provides for no  exceptions to 
Articles 100  and 235  even in respect of the  trade mark  law  provisions that 
it covers.  Article  100  is in Part three of the Treaty "Policy of the 
Community",  Title  I  "Common  rules",  Chapter  3  "Approximation  of  laws". 
Article  235  is in Part six "General and final provisions".  As  a  result, 
therefore.  of its position and  wording,  the first sentence of Article  36's 
restrictions affect  only Articles  30  to  34  and not Articles 100 and 
235.  It does  not  reserve  any powers  to  the Member  States that rule out  the 
adoption of Commmli ty measures  for the  approximation of  la~,rs  and  the  creation 
of a  composite  law. 
The  case-law of the  Court  of  Ju~tice supports this contention.  In 
the  Sin~enthal I  case,  it was  submitted1J that Article  36  leaves  the matters 
to which it refers to be  dealt with by Member  States under their sovereign 
powers  and that if the  Community  nevertheless takes  legislative action  in 
one  of those fields,  this cannot  imply the  surrender by the Member  States 
of the  powers  reserved to  them  under  Article  36~  The  Court  of Justice 
rejected this interpretation of the  EEC  Treaty2 J: 
"The  fifth recital  of Directive No.  64/432/EEC  correctly states:  'Whereas 
the  right a  Member  States under Article  36  of the Treaty to  continue  to  apply 
prohibitions or restrictions on  imports,  exports  or goods  in transit  justified 
on  grounds  of the protection of health and  life of humans  and  animals nevertheless 
does  not  exempt  them  from  the obligation to approximate  the  provisions on  which 
those  prohibitions  and  restrictions are based,  in so far as the  differences 
between  those  provisions hinder the  implementation and functioning of the 
common  agricultural policy9 •  Article  36 is not  designed to reserve  certain 
matters to the exclusive  jurisdiction of Member  States but  permits national 
laws  to derogate  from  the principle of the  free movement  of goods  to  the 
extent to which such derogation is and continues to be  justified for the 
attainment  of the objectives referred to in that article." 
1 ) 
2) 
Judg.nent  of the  Court  of Justice of  15  December  1976,  Case  35/76  "Health 
inspections", /J97f/  ECR  1871  1882  and  1885,  Ground  13. · 
Loc.  cit. Ground  14. - 10-
In  Tedeschi  v.  Denkavit,  the  Court  tepeated the  last sentence  quoted 
above  word for word  and went  on  to  say that1J: 
"Where, in application of Article  100  of the Treaty,  Community  directives 
provide for the  harmonization  of the measures necessary to ensure  the 
protection of animal  and human  health and establish Community  procedures 
to check that they are  observed,  recourse  to Article  36  is no  longer 
justified and  the appropriate  checks must  be  carried out  and  the measures 
of protection adopted within the  framework  outlined by the  harmonizing 
directive". 
Article  36  is therefore  applicable for as  long as and to the  extent 
that the  Community  does not  use  its own  law-making powers  or the  legislative 
measures  adopted by the  Community  do  not  actually remove  the restriction. 
Consequently in the  case of trade marks,  Article  36  will,  even after adoption 
of the  directive and  the regulation,  still be  applicable  to  any remaining 
cases of conflict between  confusingly similar national trade marks  of different 
origin  in respect  of similar goods. 
However,  the  Community  not  only has  the  power,  by means  of  legislative 
measures,  to  remove  so far as  possible and  to the extent necessary those 
restrictions on  trade  due  to national rules which were  originally authorized 
under  the first sentence  of Article  36;  it has  a  duty to  do  so.  This  follows 
from  Articles  3(a) and  (h),  100  and  235  (or,  where  appropriate,  Articles 43 
or 75),  which  impose  obligations  on  the  Community  institutions.  As  the recital 
quoted above  from  one  of the  directives that were  issued shows,  the  Commission 
and the  Council  have  always  acknowledged this obligation and  acted accordingly. 
In  numerous  fields,  they have  enacted directives and regulations which  ope~ate 
to  safeguard the interests referred to  in the first sentence of Article  36  and 
to  remove  or reduce  such restrictions on  trade  as may  occur from  time  to  time. 
Examples  of such fields are,  the  law on  foodstuffs,  veterinary law,  the  la~r 
concerning the protection of animals,  the  law  on  pharmaceutical  products  and the 
law relating to the  protection of public  health in the  case  of other goods. 
The  judgments  cited above  confirm the  obligation to  approx~te 
laws  in the fields  covered by the first sentence  of Article  36.  None  of the 
national rules which  are  exempted under the first sentence of Article  36 
from  the  obligation to abolish restrictions on  imports is immune  from 
approximation.  On  the  contrary,  approximation is the means  provided by the 
EEC  Treaty for  removing as far as  possible  restrictions on  trade  caused by 
national provisions.  The  Community  is therefore  competent  and is indeed under 
an obligation to approximate  those  provisions which form  the basis of 
prohibitions on  imports  due  to  trade mark  law.  Should such  approximation not 
be  sufficient to obviate  the need for or to  reduce  the application of such 
prohibitions on  imports,  an  attempt  must  be  made  to achieve this objective 
by creating a  Community  trade mark  as well. 
1
)  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of) October  1977,  Case  5/77 LT9717 
1555  ....  1576,  Ground  35.  Cf  also  judgment  of the  Court  of Justice  of 
5  April  1979,  Case  148/78 "Ratti" /J972/ ECR  ••••  (as yet  unpublished), 
cyc1ostyled text  page  21,  Ground  36. - 11  -
.  It was  certainly with this in mind  that the  ·  ·  · 
~i;h;:~:~~·b~rn;~~~~gbth:.:~::i ;o  which  under  >c~~~!·J~t~=~v::~~g 
the proviso "in the  prese~t state of  ~~~m~~~/~~:;.1  jud~=n~s s~b~hect to 
assumes  that  law-making a  t  f  th  C  .  our  erefore 
covered by the first  tc so f  e  _ommun1ty  institutions in the field 
of trade mark  law.  T::np;~~~s~ c~t1cl~ 36  are also admissible  in the  case 
by the  Court  to the  Commission  and  C~e  1~{erpreted, moreover,  as  an  appeal 
in this matter  failing which  "t  unc1  actu~lly to  exercise their powers 
its judgments.'  1  reserves the r1ght  to alter the  direction of 
III. Meaning  of Article  222 
Since  in all the Member  St  t  t  d 
property rights,  the question arise: :~et~:re mark.rights are  regarded  as 
this competence  of the  Co  .  .  .  and,  1f so,  to  what  extent 
Article 222  Article  222mmun1~Yd 1n  relat1on to trade marks  is limited by 
•  prov1  es that: 
"This Treaty shall in no  way  prejudice  th  the  syst  f  e  rules in Member  States govern1"ng 
em  o  property ownership". 
Thus  the  EEC  Treaty does  not itself  1  ownership in the Member  States nor d  "t  regu ate  the  systems  of property 
to  do  so.  It leaves the national  o~s 1  ~mpower the  Community  institutions 
and accepts  them.  .  sys  ems  o  property ownership as  they are 
.  Article  222  is similar tq  Article 83  of the  ECSC  Treaty2) and 
Art1cle  91  of the  Euratom  Treaty3J,  but it is not  likewise restricted 
to specific items of property.  Article  222  therefore also  covers the 
rules governing the  system  of ownership of trade marks. 
A study of the historic background to Article 222  shows  that the 
Contracting Parties wished to protect themselves  from  interference by  the 
Community  in the matter of property ownership,  which is of importance  to 
their economic  systems.  Each Member  State wished to retain the  power  to 
decide for itself ~hether the various means  of production should be  publicly 
or privately owned,  or both.  In particular,  questions of expropriation of 
property so  that it is held in public ownership,  and of transfer of property 
into private  ownership were  to remain  the  preserve of the Member  State. 
This  is the  meaning of Article 222  and· of the words  ••rules governing 
the  system  of property ownership"  used in ito  They  mean  the  rules governing 
the way  in which  property is to be  owned.  Each Member  State is to continue 
to decide whether trade marks  are to be  private and/or public property, 
whether they should be  disappropriated or put into private ownership and, 
if so,  for whose  benefit and at  \~hose expense. 
1 )  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 22  June  1976,  Case  119/75  Terrapin v. 
Terranova  .lf97f/ EGR  1039- 1061,  Ground 7. 
2)  Article 83  provides:  "The  establishment of the  Community  shall in no  way 
prejudice the system of ownership of the undertakings to which  this Treaty 
applies." 
3)  Article  91  provides:  "The  system  of o-wnership  applicable  to a.ll  objects, 
materials and assets which  are not  vested in the  Community  under this 
Chapter shall be  determined by  the  law  of each Member  State." 
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"Rules  governing the  system of property ownership"  are not  the  same 
thing as  "ownership"  or "proprietary rights".  The  latter are by no  means 
unaffected by the  EEC  Treaty.  On  the  contrary,  certain provisions of the 
Treaty and of the  Community  law  derived therefrom  govern the  rights and 
obliRations  arising from  ownership of movable  and  immovable  property.  They 
extend or limit not  only thA  enjoyment  or exerr.ise  of  propriet~ry rights but 
also  their scope and  content. 
The  most  noteworthy example  is that of proprietary rights in 
undertakings.  Under  Article 54(3)(g),  the  Cotincil  and  Commission  are 
obliged to  coordinate "the  safeguards which,  for the  protection of the 
interests of members  and others,  are required by Member  States of companies 
or firms  ••••••"•  The  purpose  of this coordination by means  of directives, 
which  has  alrea,dy been partly achieved,  is to  "make  equivalent"  the  rights 
and duties of shareholders in the  various  types of companies  which  exist in 
the Member  States.  This means  that  Community  law  has  to determine  the  content 
of and  the  limits upon  ownership of companies  in the  Community.  It is by  this 
means  that freedom  of establishment,  free movement  of capital,  investment  in 
companies,  their growth and undistorted competition  between  themis to be  promoted 
in the  common  market.  As  this approximation of national  law  is not  sufficient 
to set up  a  common  market  for  companies,  the  Commission  has also  proposed to 
the  Counci~ a  regulation based on  Article  235  embodying  a  statute for European 
cornpanies1J.  This  regulation is intended to  create new  proprietary rights and  to 
determine  the  extent to which they are protected. 
Articles 54(3)(g)  and  222  show  how  the  EEC  Treaty itself delimits 
the  powers.  The  content of a  proprietary right  and  the limitate,  or scope, 
of the protection afforded to it may  be  laid down  by  the  Community  to  the  extent 
required by its objectives,  and  in particular to the  extent  required for the 
proper functioning of the  common  market.  On  the  other hand,  the  assignment of 
property to private  and/or public owners,  and  hence  the  question whether 
property is to be  expropriated from  private  owners  or to be  transferred from 
public into  private  ownership,  remain the  preserve  of the Member  States. 
The  established practice of the  Commission  and  Council  in the field of company 
law  confirms this interpretation of·Article 222. 
It can scarcely be  that  a  different rule applies to the field of 
trade mark  law.  A common  market  in goodsmd services marketed under trade 
mark  is to be  set up  by approximating the  content of and  the  limits upon  the 
ownership of national trade marks  and by creating and determining the  extent 
of the  protection afforded to a  new  proprietary right,  the  Community  trade mark. 
In no  other way  can  the restrictions on  intra-Community trade be  positively 
abolished.  Article  222  is not designed to  prevent the  Community  from  attaining 
its objectives.even in the vast field of intellectual property.  It merely 
obliges  the  Community  in the  course of its activities to  respect  property 
ownership in the Member  States. 
1 ) 
Bulletin of  the  European  Communities,  Supplement  4/1975. 
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.  If the  Contracting Parties had  intended to reserve  for  themselves 
by means. of Article  222  the  power  to  determine  the  rules  governing "industrial 
and  commercial  property"  (Article  36),  they would not  have  included such 
property in Article  36.  Article  222  is, in fact,  in Part six of the  Treaty, 
"General and final  provisions".,  Consequently,  it applies  to  the  provisions 
of ArticleS30 to  34  as well.  Owing  to  t~ fact that under Article  36  industrial 
and  commercial  property was  excluded only from  the  prohibitions  contained in 
Articles  30  to  34  - and what is more,  only to the  limited extent  determined 
by the first and  second sentences - the Member  States  expressly indicated that 
it is partly covered by Articles  30  to  34  and completely covered by the 
remaining Treaty prov1s1ons.  Article  222  can  therefore  have  only the  other 
meaning referred to  above.  The  difference  in the  terms used in Articles  36  and 
222  - "property"  and "rules governing the  system  of property ownership" - is 
further  confii'ITlation that  Article  222  provides for no  exception  in the  case  of 
industrial and  commercial  property. 
Nevertheless,  the  Community's  legislative measures  in relation to 
national trade mark  law which  are  admissible  on  these  grounds must  also  take 
account  of the  delimitation of powers specified in Article  222.  )The  directive 
and  the  regulation must  not  encroach upon1he  essence,  substance1,  or existence 
of trade mark  ownership  in  the Member  States.  Thfs  would  amount  to more  than 
a  determination of the contents,  protection  and  limits of trade mark  ownership. 
It would be  an  action  analogous to expropriation and  would  prejudice  the rules 
in Member  States governing the  system  of property ownership.  The  Community 
would not be  competent  to  do  this. 
In this connection,  it is worthwhile  exam1n1ng  the  limits that the 
Court  of Justice has  placed on  the  applicability to  trade mark  ownership of 
the  prohibitions contained in the  EEC  Treaty  (in particular Articles  30,  85 
and 86).  In well-established case  law,  the  Court  distinguishes between  the 
obtaining or granting of trade mark  rights and the exercise of those  rights. 
'rhe  exercise of such rights is subject to the  prohibi  tions1  wherea~ the 
granting of them  is not.  In  Consten  and Grundig it was  held that2J: 
"Article  222  confines itself to stating that the 'l'reaty shall in no  way 
prejudice  the  rules  in Member  States governing the  system  of property ownership'. 
The  injunction contained in Article  3  of the  operative  part of the  contested 
decision to refrain from  using rights under national  trade-mark  law  in order 
to set  an obstacle  in the way  of parallel  imports  does not  affect the grant . 
of those  rights but  only limits their exercise to the  extent necessary to 
give  effect to  the prohibition under  Article  85(1)". 
Since  then,  the  Court  has not  h~d occasion  to  consider Article  222, 
but it has  stated,  relying on  Article  3~3) 
"that,  although  the  Treaty does  not  affect the  existence  of rights recognised 
by the  legislation of  a  Member  State with  regard to industrial and  commercial 
property,  the  exercise of such rights may  nevertheless fall within  the 
prohibitions  laid down  by the Treaty". 
1)  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of  14  May  1974  - Nold,  4/73,  [f97{l ECR  491, 
508,  Ground  of Judgment  No.  14. 
2)  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 13  July  1966,  Joined  Cases  56  and  58/64 
[f96ij  ECR  299  - 345• 
.))  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 8  June  1971,  Case  78/70 Deutsche  Grammophon 
v.  Metro_L197l7 ECR  487  at 499-500,  Ground  11;  3  July  1974,  Case  192/73Van  Zuylen 
v.  Hag  /T97Y_E!CR  731  - 743,  Ground  8;  31  October  1974,  Case  16/74  Centrafarm v. 
Wint'nrop  .fi.971JECR 1183- 1194,  Ground  6;  22  June  1976,  Case  119/75 Terra.;li,l  J. 
Terranova /J97§}  ECR  1039  ...  1061 1  Grour.d  5;  23  May  1978~  Case  102/77  Hoffm-an-
La  Roche  v.  Centrafarm  [197![/ ECR  1139  - 11641  Ground  8;  10  October  1978,  Case 
3/78 Centrafarm v.  American  Home  Products  LT97~
7ECR 1823  - 1840,  Ground  9. - 14  -
The  elements which to  to make  up the right of property in a  trade 
mark  are  governed,  however,  not only by national  law  but  also by  Community 
law,  which  places  limite on  such O'l;o.'!lership.  Only those rights  "which  constitute 
the specific subject-matter of that  prope~t1" are,  in fact,  to be  regarded as 
elements constituting trade mark  ownership  •  The  Court itself 'ummed  up its 
case  law  on  this  point  in its  judgment  in Terrapin v.  Terranova2•  What  remains 
unaffected,  according to this  judgment  is the  right  of property in a  trade mark 
in the  sense  in which  the  Court  of Justice has interpreted the  EEC  Treaty in 
relation thereto,  not  as it is defined to  be  in the  domestic  laws  of the  Member 
States,  which  vary from  ore to  the other. 
A corresponding limit to  law-making by the  Community  can be  inferred 
from  this well-established case  law  on  the  scope  of the  prohibitions  in the 
Treaty regarding trade mark  o"mership,  viz that although the extent of the 
protection afforded to  trade mark  ownership may  be  harmonized, ·neither the 
existence nor the  substance  of the  rights flowing  from  trade mark  ownership 
may  in the  process of harmonisation be  encroached upon.  The  methods of determining 
when  such  ownership exists may  therefore be  harmonised,  just as  they may  be 
dealt with by the Court's  judgments  on  the  prohibitionscontained in the  Treaty. 
The  draft directive respects this limit  scrupulously. 
of the draft regulation.  It provides  for  the creation of a  new 
at  Community  level,  the  extent of which  is as  precisely defined 
harmonised national rights of property in the  draft directive. 
The  same  is true 
right of property 
as  that  of the 
D.  Article  235:  power  of the  institutions to create  a  trade mark  system. 
Article  3  provides that the  activities of the  Community  are  to  be 
carried out  "as  provided  in this Treaty",  that is to say by means  of the 
exercise  of the  powers  conferred upon  the  Community  institutions by the  EEC 
Treaty. 
The  first sentence of Article 4(1) ~rovides that the  tasks entrusted 
to the  Community  are  to  be  "carried out  by Liti/ institutions".  In  other words, 
the  competence  of the  Community  deriving from  its tasks is supplemented by the 
competence  conferred on  its institutions to  carry out  these  tasks,  in particular 
their legislative powers. 
The  second sentence  adds  that each institution shall act "within the 
limits of the  powers  conferred upon  it by this Treaty".  Thus,  such  action 
arises not  by virtue of the tasks entursted to  the  Community  but  by virtue 
of the  powers  conferred by the Treaty.  It therefore  remains  to be  considered 
whether the Treaty has  conferred legislative  powers  on  the  Community 
institutions to enable  them  to carry out  the  Community's  tasks referred to at 
C.I above  in the  sphere  of trade marks. 
1)  Judgment  of the  Court  of  Justic~ of 22  June  1976,  Case  119/75 /J97§]ECR  1039 
- 1061,  Ground  5. 
2) 
Loc.  cit.,  Grounds  6 and 7. - 15-
Since  the Treaty confers no  specific power  to  lay down  directly 
applicable  Community  law,  i.e. to make  regulations,  concerning the  protection 
of industrial and  commercial  property,  Article  235  alone  comes  into question. 
This article provides that: 
nrf action by the  Community  should prove necessary to attain,  in  the  course 
of the operation of the  common  market,  one  of the objectives of the  Community 
and this Treaty has not  provided the necessary powers,  the  Cotincil  shall,  acting 
unanimously on  a  proposal from·  the  Commission  and after consulting the  Assembly, 
take  the  appropriate measures." 
It is accordingly for the  Community  institutions to consider and  decide 
whether and when  action by the  0ommunity  is necessary and whether the  rematjing 
requirements of Article 235  are met.  In the words  of the  Court  of Justice  : 
"The  power  to take  the measures  envisaged by this article is conferred,  not  on 
the Member  States acting together,  but  on  the  Council in its capacity as  a 
Community  institution.  The  Council  acts on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and 
after consulting the  Assembly." 
In accordance with the  procedural  sequence  of proposal,  consultation 
and  adoption,  it is in the first instance for  the  Commission,  in exercise of 
its powers  and upon  its own  responsibility,  to  examine  the need for action by 
the  Community,  before submitting a  proposal to the  Council.  Only  the  Commission 
is empowered  to make  a  proposal.  After considering all aspects of the matter 
over a  period of  two  years,  the  Commission  concluded in the  summer  of 1976  that 
action by the  Community was  necessary to create a  Community  system of trade mark 
law  and  deci~ed on  6 July 1976  to draw  up the appropriate measures under 
Article  2352>. 
I. Need  for action by  the  Community 
According to the wording of Article 235,  the  competence  of the 
Community  is subject to three  restrictive conditions: 
the attainment  of one  of the objectives of the  Community  must  be  at stake; 
this objective must  be  one  which is to be  attained in the  course  of the 
operation of the  common  market; 
action by the  Community  must  be necessary for this purpose. 
1)Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 18  February 1970,  Case  38/69  Commission 
v. Italy /J972J  ECR  47-- 57,  Ground  10. 
2)See Memorandum  on  the  creation of an  EEC  trade mark,  Bulletin of the 
European  Communities,  Supplement  8/76,  pp.  7-16. 
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1. The  Community  objectives to be attained by means  of the  Community 
trade mark 
The  creation of a  Community  trade mark  is designed to achieve,  in 
relation to trade marks,  the  following  Community  objectives which are  expressly 
laid down  in the  EEC  Treaty: 
the  abolition of obstacles to freedom  of movement  for  goods  and services 
(Article  3(a)  and  (c)); 
the  institution of a  system ensuring that  competition is not  distorted 
(Article  3(f) ); 
the  establishment of a  common  market  (Article 2); 
the  development  of economic activities (Article 2). 
The  Court  of Justice has expressly confirmed that  the activities 
provided for in the various  paragraphs  of  Articl~ 3  are also objectives of 
the  Community  within the meaning of Article  2351). The  Court  has held moreov:er 
that the objectives set out  in Articles  2  and  3  are not  a  general  programme 
devoid of legal effect,  but are binding law,  and,  further,  that the
2
)ndividual 
provisions of the  Treaty are to be  interpreted by reference  to  them  • 
2.  Attainment  of objectives by means  of the  Community  trade mark  in the  course 
of the  operation of the  common  market 
Whether action by the  Community  is necessary depends  secondly on 
whether it is possible  to attain the objective in question  "in the  course of 
the  operation of the  common  market". 
The  extent  of this restriction depends  on  what  is meant  by  common 
market  within tht meaning of Article  235.  There  are no  grounds for interpreting 
this term as  used in that Article  otherwise  than  by reference to Articles  ?.  and 
3,  i.e.  in the  sense of a  European  internal market  based on  principles,  rules, 
procedures  and policies embodied  in  Community  law.  As  in Article  2  ("by establishing 
a  common  market")  so  also  in  Article  235  the  words  "in the  course of the  operation 
of the  common  market"  have not  only an  instrumental character but  also  an 
objective-related character. 
The  objective  sought  by the  Community  is therefore not  to be  attained 
outside  the  common  market,  in the  sense  indicated above,  but \vithin it,  in the 
course  of its operation, and within the  limits  laid. down  by it.  In attaining the 
Community's  objective,  the  system of the  common  market  and  the  operation of 
the  common  market  must  not  be  lost sight of.  Indeed,  they must  not  be  impaired. 
The  action taken must  be  geared to  serve,  facilitate,  safeguard or promote 
the operation of the  common  market. 
1) 
2) 
Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 12  July 1973,  Case  8/73"Value  for  customs 
purposes" /J97fl ECR  897  - 907 1  Ground  3t  "The  establishment  of  a  customs 
union  •••  is one  of the objectives of the  Community  under Article  3(a)  and  (b) 
of the  Treaty" within  the meaning of Article  235  (·which  is referred to 
previously). 
Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of  21  February 1973,  Case  6/72  "Continental 
Can"  /J97l] ECR  215,  244  ..:..  246  Grounds  23-25  to  the  end. 
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The  intention underlying the  creation of a  Community  trade mark  system 
is,  exactly,  the  attainment  of the  Community  objectives discussed above,  by 
the  establishment  of a  common  market  in marked  goods  which  is properly organised 
from  the  legal point  of view. 
3.  Need  for a  Community  trade mark  system 
For the  purposes  of Article  235  it is not sufficient that a  Community 
objective is to be  attained and that the objective can be  attained in the 
course of the  operation of the  common  market.  The  attainment of the  objective 
must  also  11prove  necessary".  Otherwise  the  Commission,  and later on  the 
Council,  have  no  power  to act. 
Could  the  abovementioned objectives of the  Community  (see  1  above) 
be attained without  the  creation of a  Community  trade mark  system?  What  is 
its specific contribution to the attainment of these objectives? 
a) Free  movement  of marked goods 
The  situation which nowadays  still obtains,  whereby the  proprietor 
of a  trade mark  can  acquire  trade marks  valid only at national level and 
therefore relies on  the  exclusive  right attaching thereto  in order to  prevent 
the  importation of products originating in other Member  States which  bear the 
same  or a  similar trade mark  as his own  can be  progressively rectified only 
by creating a  trade mark  law  which is directly applicable  throughout  the 
Community  and  a  trade mark  authority with  Community-wide  powers.  There  is no 
alternative to  the  Community  trade mark.  This is discussed more  fully at II 
below. 
b)  Free  competition in marked goods 
This  Community  system is indispensable,  moreover,  in order to translate 
into reality,  step by step,  an  important  aspect  of the  creation of a  system  of 
Undistorted competition,  namely free  competition  in goods  and  services marketed 
under trade mark,  unimpeded by provisions of national trade mark  law.  It is 
only by means  of a  Community  trade mark  system that trade mark  protection can 
be  integrated into a  system  of free  intra-Community  competition  ~marked goods. 
c)  The  common  market  and competition  in marked  goods 
Both aspects  together- free movement  of and free  competition  in 
marked goods  and  services within the  Community- are essential elements  of the 
third Community  objective mentioned above,  namely the  establishment  of a 
common  market.  It would appear,  therefore,  that  a  Community  trade mark  system 
is also necessary for the  creation of a  common  market  in goods  and services 
which  are to be  marketed under trade marks. 
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This  is not all,  however.  It remains  to be  shown  that a  Community 
trade mark  system  is necessary to translate into reality the remaining aspects 
of the  Treaty objectives of "the establishment  of a  common  market"  and "the 
institution of a  system ensuring that competition is not distorted"  and thereby 
to promote  the  fundamental  objectives of Article 2.  Both of these  concepts 
imply not  only the mutual  opening up of national markets but also the  creation 
of conditions which are  opposite  to  a  European  taternal market  in marked goods. 
At  the  present  time,  trade mark  cover for the  whole  area of the  Community 
can  only be  obtained by making application for registration of the  same  mark  to 
a  number  of Trade  Mark  Offices whose  procedures  are different because  they are 
governed by domestic  laws.  This would still be  the  case  even after the national 
laws  had  been harmonised.  The  Community  system of trade marks will make  it 
possible,  however,  to  obtain ~  trade mark  for ~  territory comprising all 
the  Member  States by means  of one  application  submitted to one  trade mark 
office under ~  procedure  governed by ~  law. 
In this way,  cross-frontier competition within  the  Community  will, 
compared  with national  competition,  no  longer be  burdened with and distorted 
by a  multitude of applications, offices,  procedures,  laws,  territorially limited 
property rights and  sevenfold1J  administrative  costs with  correspondingly high 
charges  and fees.  There will be  legal and administrative arrangements at 
Community  level,  and  rates of charges,  in the  same  way  as  in the Member  States. 
Without  such  a  Community-wide  system it will not be  possible  to  set up the 
common  market  in marked goods,  iee. it will not  develop into an  internal market. 
Fragmentation of the  Community  as a  result of the existence of different trade 
marks,  laws,  administrative  arrangements  and costs will be unavoidable. 
The  national trade mark  offices would not be  able  to apply the trade 
mark  law  of the  Community  effectively,  uniformly and cheaply.  There  would be 
difficulties as  regards applications for marks,  priority of applications,  entry 
in the register,  the  extent  to which  acts  done  by the  Trade  Marks  Offic~would 
have  effect throughout  the terri  tory of the  C.ommuni ty,  languages,  the  uniform 
application of the  regulation  and  uniform  legal protectiop of marks.  Staff 
and  administrative  costs would  inevitably be  high.  To  this extent  the  position 
is no  different from  that of patent  laH.  Since  there  has  ah-.rays  been  agreement 
among  all governments  and  persons  concerned with the matter that  a  European 
trade mark  authority is an  absolute necessity,  there is no  need  to  labour this 
aspect further. 
d)  Expansion of the  economy  by means  of marked  goods  produced  in Europe 
To  what  extent then will  the  Community  trade mark  system  promote 
economic  expansion,  which is  one of the  principal objectives of the  Community 
laid down  in Article  27 
.j. 
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The  introduction of the  mark  at  Community  level will  open  up  new  and 
extended channels of econonic activity.  It "'rill  enable  industrial and commercial 
undertakings to market  their products  and services  throughout  the  Community  under 
a  single trade mark  which  enjoys  Community-wide,  uniform  protection.  It is therefore 
a  new  method,  and an  additional method,  of developing new  European  markets for 
new  products and services and of expanding existing national  markets  into 
European  ones.  It will thus make  it easier to exploit the advantages of mass 
production.  Intra-Community trade will be  simplified,  extended  and rationalized. 
For all of these  reasons  (a-d),  the  Commission  considers it necessary 
within the meaning  of Article  235  to create  a  Community-wide  system  of trade 
mark  protection. 
II.  Absence  of the necessary powers  in the  Treaty for attaining an objective 
of the  Community 
The  Court  of Justice has expressed its views  on  this as follows1): 
"Article 235  offers a  supplementary means  of action  and applies  only in the 
cases for which  the Treaty has not  provided the necessary pOltlers  for the 
realisation of the object in view". 
It must  therefore be  considered whether  approximation  of national 
trad~ mark  law  pursuant to  Article  100  is sufficient to achieve  the free 
movement  of goods  and free,  undistorted competition  in  goods  and  services which 
are marketed under trade marks.  The  first paragraph of Article  100  states that: 
"The  Council  shall  1  acting unanimously on  a  proposal f:rom  the  Commission 1  issue 
directives for the  approximation of such provisions  laid down  by  law,  regulation 
or administrative action in Member  States as directly affect the  establishment 
or functioning of the  common  market." 
In order to  comply with this instruction,  the  Commission  decided on 
6  July 1976  to prepare  a  directive to  approximate  those  provisions of trade 
mark  law which  impede  the attainment of the  above-mentioned objectives and 
hence  the proper functioning. of the  common  market  in goods  and services 
marketed under trade marke21. 
The  draft directive3),  however,  can  achieve  the desired results only 
in part. Between  the  result that  can  be  achieved by means  of approximation and 
the objective to be  attained,  namely  a  European  internal market  for marked 
goods,  there is the following gaps  even if national trade mark  laws  were 
harmonized,  several persons acting independently could obtain protection  in. 
different Member  States for the  same  or a  similar trade mark  and consequently 
prevent  imports  into their country of the marked  goods  in question. 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 18  Februar.J:  1964,  Joined 
74/63 "Internationale Handelevereniging"  /J9~ ECR  3  - 29. 
Cases  73  and 
Memorandum  on  the creation of an  EEC  trade mark,  Bulletin of the European 
Communities,  Supplement  8/76,  p.  12,  points 35- 38. 
Draft  Council Directive on  the  approximation of Member  States'  trade mark 
laws,  Doc.  III/D/1293/79 of July 1979. 
.;. This  is because,  even after approximation,  the  registration of a 
trade mark will be  governed solely by the trade mark  law  in  force  in the 
Member  State  concerned.  Even  in the  future,  therefore,  Trade Marks  Offices 
will disregard registrations under the  law  of other Member  States.  Even 
after approximation,  every trade mark will  have  effect only within the Member 
State whose  Trade  Marks  Office  granted it1  for each national Office grants 
exclusive rights specifically for its own  national territory. 
This situation is in turn  due,  to  the fact that the rights ar1s1ng 
under the trade mark  and the  powers  of the trade mark  authorities are defined 
and will continue  to be  defined by national  laws.  These  are valid only within 
the respective national territories and afford rights which  are effective only 
there.  The  rights arising under  the  trade mark  are  therefore of territorially 
limited scope. 
The  approximation  of national  laws  by means  of directives  cannot alter 
this situation.  The  purpose of approximation is neither to extend exclusive 
rights geographically to  the territory of the· other Member  States nor to replace 
them  by exclusive  rights which are effective throughout  the  Community,  but  only 
to adapt national trade mark  laws  to the  requirements  of the  common  market  without 
calling their continued existence  into question.  Since  approximation  does not 
affect the territorial nature ofirade mark  laws  and of the activities of trade 
mark  authorities,  it cannot  overcome  the territorial nature of exclusive rights. 
Directives  can  give rise to identical  law in all the States,  but not to ~ 
law of the  Community. 
Consequently,  in order gradually to  cover the  gap  between the  exercise 
of the  power  to approximate  laws  by means  of directives and  the  attainment of 
the  Community  objectives discussed above,  a  Community  trade mark  law  should be 
created,  applicable generally and directly in each Member  State,  which  will 
harmonise  any outstanding national trade mark  laws,  and  a  Community  trade mark 
authority with  Community-wide  powers  should be  set up.  Only  in this way  can 
exclusive rights which are valid throughout  the  Community  be  granted.  Only 
in this way  can the  fragmentation  into national territories which  dismembers 
the  common  market  be  overcome,  for each trade mark,  so  that it operates 
throughout  the  Community.  The  conflicts and hence  the obstacles to the  free 
movement  of goods  and  services  and  to  competition will  diminish as more  and 
more  existing national trade marks  are  converted into  Community  trade marks 
and as new  marks  are  increasingly registered as  Community  trade marks.  The 
objectives of the  Community  can be  attained much  more  readily by this means 
than by approximation of national laws alone. 
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The  approximation of national trade mark  law  cannot,  therefore,  achieve 
those specific aspects of the  said objectives of the  Community  which,  by the 
creation of a  Community  trade mark  law,  can  progressively be  achieved.  The 
power  conferred by Article  100  is not sufficient for the  attainement  of these 
remaining aspects of the  above-mentioned objectives, nor for a  gradual shifting 
from  partial realisation to complete realisation of those objectives.  Accordingly, 
the Treaty "has not  provided the necessary powers"  (Article 235).  This makes  the 
point.  Article  235  does not require that the  Treaty should provide no  powers at 
all to attain the objectives.  The  Court  of Justice has  decided that Article 235 
is also applicable where  "the procedure prescribed by Article 100  for the 
approximation of legislation-by means  of directives does not  provide  a  really 
adequate  solution
11  for the  attainment of a  Community  objective  (and wv,re  there 
is doubt  as  to the extent of other powers  provided for in the Treaty)  • The 
approximation  of national trade mark  law  and the  creation of a  directly applicable 
Community  trade mark  law,  in their respective areas of operation,  are  two 
complementary means  of attaining the same  objectives. 
III. Adoption  of appropriate measures 
Where  it is shown  that,  besides approximating the national laws 
relat~g to marks,  other Community  action is necessary for the purpose of 
attaining some  of its objectives in the  course of the  operation of the 
common  market,  and that Article 100  does not provide the  requisite powers 
to that end,  "the  Council shall,  acting unanimously on  a  proposal from  the 
Commission  and after consul  titrg the  Assembly  take  the aPPropriate measures" 
(Article  235). 
Since,  as already indicated {see II above),  there is need of a 
Community  trade mark  law which is generally applicable,  binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable  in all Member  States,  a  directive is not 
sufficient and a  regulation is required  (second paragraph of Article 189). 
Directives do,  of course,  lay down  Community  law,  but as a  matter of principle 
such  Community  law  is not directly applicable in all Member  States.  The  directive 
is merely addressed to  the Member  States  (third paragraph of Article  189). 
1)  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 12  July 1973,  Case  8/73  "Value for 
customs  purposes" /J97  iJ ECR  897  907,  Grounds  3 and 4. 
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If, therefore,  what  is wanted is a  Community  law which has  general 
application,  is directly applicable in all Member  States and is binding in 
its entirety,  a  regulation should be adopted.  Because  directives need to be 
incorporated into national  law,  in which  case  the exclusive rights granted will· 
end at national frontiers,  those  aspects of the  Community  objectives which are 
here  in question  cannot be  achieved by directives.  But  they can be  achieved 
by means  of a  regulations.  The  Council  Regulation proposed by the  Commission 
on  the  Community  trade mark  is therefore  im  "appropriate measure" within the 
meaning of Article  235. 
The  substantive  provisions concerning the  Community  trade marks  which 
are  contained in the  draft regulation are the most  "appropriate" means  of 
attaining the  Community  objectives referred to  (see  I  3 above)  although this need 
not be  discussed in detail here  in view  of the  foregoing commentary  on  the matter 
(see  B and  D I  and II above).  The  adoption of these  provisions would be  a 
decisive step towards  the  attainment of the  objectives laid down  in the  EEC 
Treaty. 
In order to achieve  these objectives,  however,  it is not enough simply 
to  enact  a  substantive trade mark  law.  On  the  contrary,  in order to  enforce it 
many  kinds of official action along prescribed lines and  judicial protection of 
the parties concerned are  indispensable.  Trade marks need to be  applied for, 
examined,  registered,  protected and monitored in accordance with appropriate 
official procedures.  The  same  applies  to the protection of earlier trade marks. 
Substantive trade mark  law,  its.  implemention by the administrative  departments 
and the  legal protection of the parties cannot be  separated from  one  another. 
This raises the question whether the Council's  power  to take "the 
appropriate measures"  also covers: 
the creation of a  Community  Trade Marks  Office; 
the  conferment  on  the  Office of the  power  to address  the  decisions  listed 
at B to the  relevant parties; 
the  conferment  of the  powers  listed at B on  the  Commission  and ··the  Court 
of Justice; 
the  adoption  of procedural rules. 
1.  Wording of Article  235 
a)  "Measures" 
In the various  language versions of Article  235,  reference is made 
to  '~forskrifter",  "Vorschriften",  "measures",  "disposi  tiona",  "disposizioni", 
"maatregelen".  By  comparing these  various  terms,  it can be  seen that Article 
235  covers not only measures which  make  provision for something (i.e. which 
create an obligation to  take  a  specific course  of action) but  also measures 
which,  although they do  not prescribe a  specific course  of action,  nevertheless 
lay down  substantive rules,  or rules relating to  procedure,  legal protection, 
organisation or financing and which  permit  something to be  done  or initiate a 
procedure or confer power  on  an institution or create a  Community  body  on  which 
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they confer powers.  The  term  "Vorschriften" is used regularly in the  German 
version of the  EEC  Treaty in this sense  of "measures"  (df.  in particular the 
second subparagraph of Article 79(3)).  Indeed,  having regard to the  terms 
"Vorschriften"  and "forskrifter" used in the  German  and Danish versions and to 
the  terms used in the other four versions,  there are no  grounds for supposing 
that there was  any intention of restricting the kinds  of measures  which  oould 
be  taken under Article  235.  On  the  contrary,  the word  "measures" means  all 
Treaty provisions which  confer powers  on  the  Community  institutions. 
b)  "Appropriate" measures 
Next,  Article  235  expressly authorises the taking of the  "appropriate" 
measures.  By  using this adjective Article  235  leaves open  the  choice of the 
type  of action to be  taken.  The  means  to  be  employed  therefore depend  on  the 
circumstances of the  case and on  the  Community  objective to  be  attained, not 
the  reverse.  To  "take the appropriate measures" means  to adopt with legally 
binding effect those measures which  prove necessary in each particular situation 
to attain a  given  Community  objective in the  course of the  operation of the 
common  market.  If Article 235  were  to be  interpreted,  not in conformity with 
its wording,  but restrictively, it would  lose mnch  of its meaning and,  at least 
in the trade mark  sphere,  could not be  applied in a  reasonable and effective 
manner. 
c)  "Action by the  Communit;y:" 
According to  the  introductory words  of Article  235,  it is sufficient 
that "action by the  Community"  should prove necessary.  First of all,  therefore, 
the  provision applies to every type  of action that may  prove necessary to attain 
a  Community  objective in the course of the operation of the  common  market. 
Secondly,  the worris  "by the  Community"  leave  open  the  question whether such 
action is taken by Community  institutions or bodies or by both. 
2.  Purpose  of Article  235 
The  analysis made  at  1  above  of the wording of Article  235  is confirmed 
by the purpose  of that Article.  Supplementing the means  which  the EEC  Treaty 
provides for  the attainment of.the Community's  objectives is not  only admissible 
under Article  235  but is actually its sole purpose.  The  provision is designed 
to fill the  gap between  the objectives laid down  in the Treaty and the  inadequate 
or completely non-existent means  that the Treaty provides,  or fails to provide for 
attaining them.  The  fact that the provision exists is proof that the Member 
States which  concluded the Treaty were  aware  of the  potential inadequacy of the 
means  that  they had made  ~vailable and wished to prevent  the institutions  f~om 
being completely or partially paralysed as  a  result.  Article 235  consequently 
refers to the  objectives  laid down  in the Treaty and coltstitutes  an  addition 
to the series of measures  prescribed by the Treaty for their attainment.  Hence 
it doesnot  exclude  the use  of any particular means  but instead authorizes those 
measures  which  prove necessary and  appropriate in each case. 
.;. - 24-
If,  under  Article  235,  laws  can be  adopted which need to  be  implemented 
either by the  Commission  or by an  existing or prospective specialized Community 
authority,  there must  be  an implied intention to  confer on  the  Commission  by 
means  of "appropriate measures"  the necessary implementing powers  and to afford 
effective legal protection against its decisions to the persons affected by 
them.  Both sets of powers  are  covered by the power  to take  "the appropriate 
measures".  To  argue the contrary would  in reality be  tantamount  to saying 
that the  Community  institutions and bodies are  to be  denied the  possi.bili  ty 
of implementing Community  law  adopted pursuant  to Article  235.  According 
to the Meroni  judgments  of the  Court  of Justice the maintenance  of the  legal 
protection of persons  in the  common  market is an  essential precondition to 
the  conferment  of decision-making powers  on  Community  agencies  {see E  IV 
above).  For these  reasons  and in view of the  wording and purpose  of Article 
235,  there  can hardly be  any doubt  that the  Trade Marks  Office may  be  provided 
with "appropriate"  implementing powers  and that the Trade Marks  Office,  Commission 
and Court  of Justice may  be  granted "appropriate" powers  to  ensure  legal protection. 
3.  Previous practice 
The  above  interpretation of Article  235  is confirmed by previous 
practice.  Upon  proposals  from  the  Commission,  the  Council has already created 
three agencies which  are  endowed  with legal personality distinct from  that of 
the  Community.  It has established by means  of separate  Regulations,  each based 
solely on  Article  235, 
the  European  Monetary  Cooperative  Fund1)  (hereinafter called the Monetary 
Fund); 
the European  Centre  for  the  Development  of Vocational Training2)  (hereinafter 
called the  Centre);  and 
the European  Foundation forfue  improvement  of living and working conditions3) 
(hereinafter called the Foundation). 
Although  individual powers  in respect of persons in the  common  market 
were not  conferred on  the Centre  or on  the Foundation,  they were  conferred 
on  the  Commission  as  the  supervisory authority.  It has  the  right  and is under 
obligation to take  decisions regarding complaints  by a  Member  State or third 
party directly inyolved concerning the  alleged illegality of an  act of the 
agency concerned4J.  The  Council  thereby acknowledged that the vesting in 
the  Commission  of a  power  which hitherto did not  exist in the field in question 
to address  decisions to Member  States or to interested third parties in the 
common  market  might  be  an  "appropriate measure"  within the  meaning of Article  235. 
1 ) 
2) 
Regulation 
Regulation 
Po  1 • 
(EEC)  No  907/73  of  2  April  1973,  OJ  No  L 89  of 5  April  1973,  P•  2 
(EEC)  No  337/75 of 10  February 1975,  OJ  No  L  39  of  13  February 1975, 
3)  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1365/75 of 26  May  1975,  OJ  No  L 139  of  30  May  1975,  p.  1. 
4)  Third paragraph of Article  18  of the  regulation establishing the  Centre, 
loc.  cit.;  third paragraph of Article  22  of the regulation  establishing 
the Foundation,  1££•  cit. 
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As  a  result,  the  competence  of the  CoUrt  of Justice  is at the  same 
time automatically extended to enable it to review  the  legality of such acts 
of the  Commission  (Articles  173  and 175)  and indirectly of that of the  agency 
in question.  Article  127(3) of the  draft  Regulation  on  the  Community  trade 
mark  is to the  like effect. 
The  Regulations establishing the  Centre  and  the Foundation each confer 
on  the  Court  of Justice new  powers  to  give  judgment  pursuant to any arbitration 
clause  contained in a  contract and,  in the  case  of the non-contractual liability 
of the  institutions,  to give  judgment  in actions for  damages  caused by the 
agencies  in question.  This  acknowledges  that the vesting of  jurisdiction in 
the  Court  of Justice may  also be  an  "appropriate measure" within  the  meaning 
of Article 235.  Article  122(2),  (3)  and  (4)  of the  draft Regulation  on  the 
Community  trade mark  also  confers like powers  on  the  Court  of Justice. 
No  power  to address  decisions to individuals is conferred on  the Monetary 
Fund.  It is,  however,  given new  powers  of general  scope  vis-&-vis  the Member 
States.  There  were  no  such powers  either at national or at  Community  level 
before this.  The  Fund  is responsible  among  other things for bringing about 
such  concerted action by the  central banks  as is necessary for  the proper 
functioning of the  Community  foreign  exchange  system,  and for  the administration 
of very short-term financing and of short-term monetary support,  their 
amalgamation  into  a  new  mechanism  an~ - since  1979  - for  the  administration 
of the new  European  monetary system1J.  In this context,  the Board of Governors 
of the Fund is empowered  to adopt,  acting  unanimously~ decisions  and resolutions 
which  are binding on  the Member  States  (central banks)  • 
To  recapitulate,  it is clear from  previous practice that all Member 
States have  acknowledged by means  of the  Regulations adopted unanimously by 
the  Council  that the setting-up of institutions,  the granting to  them  of legal 
capacity and  the  conferment  on  them  and on  the  Commission  and  the  Court  of 
Justice  of decision-making powers  which  did not previously exist  and which 
the  institutions have  to exercise in their own  right,  can  be  "appropriate 
measures"  within· the meaning of Article  235  and can be necessary to  attain  a 
Community  objective in the  course of the operation of the  common  market. 
1)Regulation  (EEC)  No  3181/78 of 18.12.1978,  OJ  No  L 379  of 30.12.1978,  p.2. 
2)See  Regulation  (EEC)  No  907/73,  loc. cit., in conjunction with Articles 
1  to  3  of the Statutes and Article  2  of the  Rules  of Procedure  of the Fund 
in which  "decisions" and  "resolutions" of the  Board of Governors  are expressly 
mentioned.  Article  3  of Regulation  (EEC)  No.  3181/78,  loc. cit.,  empowers 
and obliges the Board of Governors  of the  Fund,  moreover,  "to take  the 
administrative measUres necessary for  the  implementation"  of the  Regulation 
relating to  the European monetary system. 
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It was  precisely in this sense  that the  Court  of Justice interpreted 
that part of  Arti~le 75  which  corresponds almost  word  for word  in this respect 
with Article  2351J: 
"In order to attain the  common  transport policy  ••• ,  the  Council is empowered 
to  lay down  'any other appropriate provisions',  as expressly provided in 
Article 75(1)(c).  The  Community  is therefore not  only entitled to enter 
into contractual relations with a  third country in this connection but also 
has  the  power,  while  observing the  provisions of the Treaty,  to  cooperate 
with that  country in setting up an  appropriate organism...  The  Community 
may  also •••  cooperate  with a  third country for the  purpose  of giving the 
organs of such  an institution appropriate  powers  of decision •••  " 
In  the  case  in point,  these  organs are a  Supervisory Board,  a 
Board of Management,  a  Director  and  a  court.  They are to have  the  power 
to take  decisions having general application  (decisions which  are binding 
in their entirety and directly applicable  in all Member  States and  in 
Switzerland)  and  decisions addressed to  individuals  (concerning the  compulsory 
contributions to be  made  by owners  of vessels to the Fund  and  compensation 
for vessels voluntarily laid up).  The  court  is to be  given  powers  in the 
relevant field which  are modelled more  or  less on  those  of the  Court  of Justice. 
As  the  quotation  shows,  the  Court  of Justice  took the view that the creation of 
such  an  international body was  permissible under  Article 75,  but  declared the 
proposed set  of rules  incompatible with the Treaty because of the questionable 
structure and  composition  of the  organs2J. 
Like  Article 75,  Article  235  does not rule  out  the  creation of agencies 
or  the  conferment  of decision-making powers  and powers  of  legal protection on 
them  - still less on  existing bodies  and institutions.  In  the trade mark  sphere 
as well  the  Council  can  take  suitable,  pertinent measures  of all kinds which are 
considered necessary to attain the  abovementioned  Community  objectives in the 
course  of the  operation of the  common  market.  As  in other fields,  these 
objectives are  decisive when  a  decision has  to  be  taken as to the means  which  are 
to be  employed  in the  field of trade marks. 
4.  Subparagraph  (c)  of the first paragraph  of Article  177 
The  Council's  power  to  create  Community  agencies  is based on  subparagraph 
(c)  of the first  paragraph of Article  177.  This  provision states that: 
"The  Court  of Justice  shall have  jurisdiction to give  preliminary rulings 
concerning (a) •••••  ;  (b) •••••  ;  (c)  the interpretation of the  statutes of bodies 
established by an  act  of the  Council,  where  those statutes so  provide." 
1)court of Justice,  26  April  1977,  Opinion 1/76- European  Laying-up Fund for 
Inland Waterway Vessels- OJ  No.C  107  of  3  May  1977,  p.  4  - p.  12 7  paragraph 5· 
2) 
Loc.  cit. pp.  13-16,  paragraphs  8-14,  21-22. 
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The  bodies which  the  EEC  Treaty has itself created (e.g.  the European 
Investment  Bank)  are manifestly not  the only ones  that exist.  On  the  contrary, 
subparagraph  (c)  of the first paragraph of Article  177  expressly provides that 
the  Council may  create new  bodies.  Article  235  is one  of the provisions which 
have  conferred on  the  Council  the  power necessary for this purpose. 
The  fact  that subparagraph  (c) of the first paragraph of Article  177 
refers to the  statutes of such bodies  shows  that the  setting-up of institutions 
which have  a  certain degree  of independence  and their own  powers  is contemplated. 
The  Member  States did not  lay down  definitively in·the Treaty which bodies 
besides the  Community  should have  legal capacity.  In particular,  Article  129,  which 
confers legal personality on  the European  Investment Bank,  does not rule  out 
the  creation by the  Council  of further bodies having  legal personality.  Similarly, 
it cannot  be  inferred from  those  Treaty provisions which  provide for the  creation 
of bodies which  do  not  have  legal capacity (Court  of Auditors,  Article 4(3);  a 
Monetary  Committee  with advisory status,  Article  105(2);  Economic  and Social 
Committee,  Article  193)  that the  creation by the  Council  of bodies having 
legal capacity is ruled out.  There  are moreover  two  different kinds  of "body" 
- and  this means  that the reverse  argument fails.  Article  177  leads to  the 
same  conclusion. 
IV.  In particular:  the need for and relevance of a  Community  Trade Marks  Office 
with powers  of enforcement 
Under  Article  235,  the Trade  Marks  Office must  be  a  necessary and 
appropriate body.  As  already explained in detail  (see B and D I  3 c  above),  for 
the purposes of trade  mark  law it is essential to have  administrative  enforcement 
of every single  trade  mark at Community  level. This  is an  extremely technical 
and specialized task.  It must  also be  ensured from  the  organizational point of 
view that,  once  initiated,  procedures  culminate  in a  decision within a  reasonable 
period.  If one  examines  how  the Member  States provide  for  the  enforcement of 
trade mark  law,  the following picture  emerges: 
In  Denmark,  this task was  conferred on  a  Directorate for Patents and 
Trade Marks  within the Ministry of Trade.  The  Registrar for Trade  Marks  and 
Designs is responsible for all activities connected with the  registration of 
trade marks.  Although  he  is included in the Ministry for administrative  and 
budgetary purposes,  in practice he  acts independently.  In the exercise  of his 
responsibility for  international cooperation  in the field of legal policy,  he 
coordinates his position with that of the Ministry. 
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In  Germany,  an  independent  supreme  Federal authority was  set up,  namely 
the  German  Patent  Office  in Munich.  The  Federal Minister of J1istice is in 
overall control of this authority,  which  alone  has  the  power  to  enforce  the 
legal protection of industrial and  commercial  property.  The  development  of 
the  law  governing industrial and commercial  property is the  preserve of the 
Federal Minister of Justice. 
In France, a  national institute for  industrial and  commercial 
property (Institut National  de  la Propriete  Industrielle,  INPI)  was  founded. 
It is a  legal person governed by  public  law  under  the  control of the 
Minister for  Industry.  In the field of  enforcemen~,  the Director of the  INPI 
takes decisions  on  his  own  responsibility.  In the  legal policy field,  he 
coordinates his position with that of the Ministry. 
In  Ireland,  the  head of the  Patent Office  (the Controller of Patents, 
Designs  and Trade  Marks)  was  given sole responsibility for  carrying out tasks 
connected with the registration of trade marks.  In the  legal policy field,  he 
coordinates his position with that  of the  Department  of Industry,  Commerce 
and Energy,  to  which  the  Office is subordinate. 
In  Italy,  the  Central Patent  Office is responsible  within the Ministry 
for .Industry,  Trade  and  Craft  Trades for  the  tasks  connected with the registration 
of trade marks.  The  Office is incorporated in the Ministry from  the 
organizational  and financial points of view but  enjoys  a  cert~in degree  of 
independence  in the day-to-day administration of trade mark natters. 
In  the  United Kingdom,  the  task of registering trade marks  is entrusted 
to the  comptroller-General for Patents,  Designs  and Trade Marks,  who  acts 
independently.  In the  legal policy field,  he  coordinates his position with that 
of the  Department  of Trade  and  Industry,  to which his department  is subordinate. 
Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  have  established a  joint trade 
marks  authority,  the Benelux Trade  Marks  Office,  with its headquarters  in 
The  Hague.  The  Office is an independent body.  Competence  in legal policy matters 
is reserved to  the  appropriate authorities of the  Contracting States. 
In the  case  of the European  Patent,  the  sixteen Contracting States have 
set up  a  separate  international organization,  the European  Patent Office  in 
Munich.  This authority has  legal personality.  It performs its executive  and 
judicial tasks independently and  on  its own  responsibility.  It is supervised 
by an  Administrative  Council,  which also has  sole  competence  in legal policy 
matters. 
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All  told it is apparent  that the  implementation of trade mark  law 
in all the Member  States is entrusted by the appropriate Ministeries,  at  least 
de  facto,  to bodies which  are to a  certain extent independent.  A separate  tPade 
mark:iUthority has  proved necessary and useful everywhere,  albeit with varying 
degrees of autonomy.  Implementation  of trade mark  law  is everywhere  detached 
from  ministerial,  legal and economic  policy activity proper,  at  least from  the 
organizational point of view if not  always  as regards staffing (in some  Member 
States  leading personalities perform both functions at once). 
As  it has  already stated in its "Memorandum  on  the  creation of an 
EEC  trade mark"1),  the  Commission  considers for these reasons that the setting-
up of a  Community  Trade Marks  Office which is largely independent  from  the 
technical point  of view is a  particularly appropriate means  of instituting a 
system of trade mark  law for the  Community  and of attaining the  abovementioned 
Community  objectives: 
- such an  Office would be  in keeping with the  executive  and  extremely technical 
nature of the  decisions to be  taken. 
It would  contribute to the objectivity and effectiveness of the  procedure 
in trade mark matters and hence  to  legal certainty. 
It would be relatively easy to set up and manage,  could be  organized on 
rational,  clear and flexible  lines and be staffed by genuine  experts. 
It would thus constitute an  appropriate  and inexpensive means  of dealing 
with thousands of individual cases with requisite speed. 
The  vast volume  of administrative work  and the numerous  technical decisions 
concerning implementation would be  directed away  from  the  Commission,  which 
would  accordingly not  be  burdened with them.  · 
For all these  reasons,  if the  Council were  to set up  a  Community  Trade 
Marks  Office  by Regulation  and confer on  it the  abovementioned powers,  it would 
be  taking "appropriate measures" within the meaning of Article  235.  This 
solution would reflect at  Community  level the state of affairs already obtaining 
in the  Member  States. 
However,  this is not  the  only course of action open  to the Council. 
Its power  to take  "the appropriate measures"  enables it to exercise its 
discretion when  choosing measures to solve a  particular problem.  It can 
therefore establish the Trade Marks  Office as a  non-independent  agency of the 
Commission  or entrust to the  Commission  itself the task of implementing 
Community  trade mark  law.  As  the solutions adopted in the various Member  States 
show,  there is a  whole  range  of alternatives which have all proved workable. 
If,  therefore,  the  solution now  contemplated by the  Commission  runs  into 
difficulties, it will not  hesitate to propose  other "appropriate measures" 
to  the  CoW'lcil. 
1 ) 
Bulletin of the  European  Communities,  Supplement  8/76  p.  17,  point  56 
et passim. 
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V.  Need  for  and relevance  of specific procedural provisions 
1.  Enforceability of decisions made  by the  Trade  Mark  Office  in relation to 
costs 
Article 80(4)  of the draft Regulation states that: 
"Any  final decision of the  Office fixing the amount  of costs shall be  deemed, 
for  the  purposes of enforcement  in the Member  States,  to be  a  final decision 
given by a  civil court of the  State in the territory of which  enforcement  is 
to be  carried out.  Verification of this decision shall be  limited to its 
authenticity." 
This provision is necessary because  the  proceedings  specified in 
Article  80  cannot  be  conducted effectively in the  Trade Marks  Office unless 
it is certain that costs  can be  enforced against  an unsuccessful party.  The 
proceedings provided for in Article  80 would  be  unrealistic without rules  on 
enforcement  of costs,  since no  litigant can  rely on  his unsuccessful  opponent 
paying costs voluntarily. 
Gommunity  law  has hitherto been  lacking in such rules.  Article  192 
refers only to  decisions  of the  Council  or  Commission  and not to  those of 
subordinate agencies.  The  laws  offue Member  States likewise contain no  rules 
which  would  enable  decisions taken by a  Community  Trade Marks  Office to  be 
enforced. 
The  question therefore arises whether power  can  be  conferred on  the 
Trade Marks  Office  to  grant rights which  are  enforceable in the Member  States 
without verification as to their substance.  In Articles  192  and  187,  the Member 
States made  provision for this as  regards  the  decisions  and  judgments  of the 
Council,  Commission  and  Court  of Justice.  This  does not mean,  however,  that 
such a  power  cannot  be  conferred on  Community  agencies.  If it is necessary 
to set up  a  Community  Trade Marks  Office which takes  decisions  on  costs  in 
specific proceedings,  it must  also  be  permissible under  Article  235  to adopt 
rules  concerning the  enforcement  of such decisions. 
Consequently,  the  Council must  take appropriate measures  pursuant 
to  Article  235  as  regards  the  enforcement  of decisions of the Office  in 
the matter of  costs.  Article 80(4)  of the  draft Regulation is based on 
Article  192  of the  EEC  Treaty and is therefore  an  "appropriate measure" 
within the meaning of Article  235.  How  it is to be  framed  in detail is 
a  matter for the  Council.  There  is therefore no need to consider the 
various detailed aspects of Article 80(4)  in this working paper  • 
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2. Jurisiction and  judicial proceedings in actions relating to Community 
trade marks 
If the  Community  creates its own  system of trade marks,  it will be 
necessary to adopt  rules of procedure for civil actions relating to Community 
trade marks.  If this is not  done,  there will be  a  gap  in the  proposed  system 
which may  jeopardize its practical value. 
The  draft Regulation  does not  provide for the creation of new  courts 
in the  form  of Community  agencies to hear these  civil actions.  They  are to be 
dealt with by the  civil courts of the Member  States and the  domestic  rules 
governing the  same  type  of action in respect of a  national trade mark  are to 
apply (Article 93  of the draft Regulation).  In consequence  of this fundamental 
decision by the authors of the draft  Regulation,  the  inevitable  encroachment  on 
the  law  of civil procedure of the Member  States will be  reduced to a  minimum. 
As  regards  jurisdiction for  actions  r~lating to  Community  trade marks 
and enforcement,  the  Convention  of 27  September  1968  on  jurisdiction and 
enforcement  of  judgments  in civil and commercial matters  (Convention  on 
jurisdiction and enforcement)  applies. 
The  system instituted by the  Judgments  Convention fails,  however, 
to solve ihe  special problems which arise where  one  Community  trade mark  can 
be  infringed in several Member  States.  As  in the  cases  covered by  the European 
Patent Convention,  it is considered necessary,  because. of the special position 
with regard to Community  trade marks,  to modify the rules contained in Articles 
2,  5(3)  and  16{4)  of the  Judgments  Convention.  Moreover,  the  second paragraph 
of Article  57  of the  consolidated version of that  Convention  (9  October  19781)) 
expressly permits  Acts  of the  institutions of the  European  Communities-
including,  therefor~,  regulations made  under Article  235  - to contain such 
special provisions2  J.  · 
It is considered necessary,  in particular,  to supplement  the rules on 
jurisdiction contained in the  Judgments  Convention with special provisions 
concerning actions for infringement  of a  Community  trade mark.  Article  91  of the 
draft Regulation  contains the relevant provisions,  which  provide,  amongst  other 
things,  in derogation  from  the  Judgments  Convention,  that  in certain circumstances 
actions may  be  heard by the  courts of the Member  State in which  the plaintiff had 
his residence.  The  courts of the Member  State in which  the act of infringement 
is committed are to have  jurisdiction only in respect of acts of infringement 
committed within  the territory of that State  (Article 91(2)). 
1)  OJ  No  L 304  of 30  October  1978,  p.  90 
2)  CF.  the report by Professor Dr.  P.  Schlosser,  OJ  No  C 59  of 5 March  1979, 
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A special rule is also necessary to regulate  the situation where 
there are  concurrent  proceedings in the  Trade  Marks  Office  and  in the civil 
courts of the Member  States.  Such  a  "two-track"  system is practicable only 
if the binding effect of decisions  and the possibilities which exist for  staying 
proceedings are  clearly specified. 
The  same  thing was  found  in connection with the  similar problems 
ar~s~ng out  of Article 85(1)  of the  EEC  Treaty,  which  provides for concurrent 
jurisdiction of the  Commission  and the courts of the Member  States in relation 
to  agreements  between undertakings.  In that  instance,  the·court of Justice 
solved the  problem  by its  judgments  on  the provisional validity of agreements 
and the possibility of a  stay of proceedings,  whereas  in the  present case it 
is both possible  and  desirable to deal with the matter immediately in.the 
Regulation. 
Thus,  Article 94  of the draft Regulation  obliges the  courts of the 
Member  States to  stay the  proceedings where  an  application has  been made  to 
the  Trade  Marks  Office for  a  declaration of lapse  or cancellation of the 
Community  trade  mark.  Also,  Article 96  of the said draft Regulation  provides 
that  lapse or cancellation of a  Community  trade mark  cannot be  pleaded as  defences 
in  proceedings before  the  courts of Member  States.  It is only in the  case where 
there is a  counte~claim for  a  declaration of lapse or cancellation that under 
Article 95  of the draft the  courts of the Member  States also have  jurisdiction. 
The  point made  regarding Article 80(4)  (see  1  above)  is valid here 
also,  namely that the  provisions of Title VIII of the  draft  Regulation,  which 
are  intended to  solve the  problems  involved,  are "appropriate" within the 
meaning of Article  235.  They  are  based extensively on  European  Patent  law 
and on  suggestions made  by the  experts  consulted.  The  details of the  structure 
of Title VIII are  a  matter for the  Council,  so particular points do  not  need 
to be  discussed in detail in this working paper. 
VI.  Conclusions 
For the  reasons  set out  at III,  IV  and V,  the authority conferred on 
the  Council by Article  235  to  take  "the  appropriate measures"  includes  the 
following powers: 
io create  ihe  Communiiy  trade mark  law contained in the  draft Regulation  and 
the  procedures laid down  therein; 
to  set up  and organise  the  Trade Marks  Office  as  a  Community  body  and,  in 
particular,  to  confer on  it the  power  to  take  the  decisions specified at B 
in respect  of individuals; 
to  confer on  the  Commission  the  powers  of action  and  supervision specified 
at B; 
to  confer on  the  Board of Appeal  of the  Trade  Marks  Office  and  on  the 
Court  of Justice the  powers  to protect  legal rights specified at B; 
io confer on  itself and on  the  Commission  the  law-making  powers  specified 
at B which  are necessary to  implement  the  Regulation  on  irade marks • 
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E.  Limits  to the  conferring of powers  on  the institutions  and on a  Trade  Marks  Office 
Article  235  authorizes the  taking of any  "appropriate measures11 •  Since 
this general expression is subject to no  restrictions,  a  specific type of act 
- namely  the conferring on  the Office of the  power  to take decisions  in trade 
mark matters - can be  excluded from  the authorization granted by Article  235 
only if this follows  from  other provisions of the  EEC  Treaty.  It must  first 
be  considered,  therefore,  whether the Treaty in fact  allows  the  creation of 
new  powers.  If it does,  it must  then be  considered whether the  Treaty itself 
confers  on  the  Commission  alone  the  power  to  implement  the  Regulation  on  trade 
marks.  If it does not,  it must  next be  considered whether the  Council is 
obliged under  the  EEC  Treaty to  confer on  the  Commission  the  power  to  implement 
the  Community  trade mark  law.  If it is not,  consideration must  be  given to whether 
and to what  extent the  EEC  Treaty places restrictions on  the conferring of  powers 
on  a  Community  Trade  Marks  Office. 
I.  Article 4 
1.  Creation of new  powers 
The  second sentence of Article 4(1)  provides that: 
"Each institution shall act within the  limits of the  powers  conferred upon  it 
by this Treaty." 
Does  this provision preclude  the  creation of new  powers  to be exercised 
by the  Commission,  the  Court  of'  Justice  and a  Community  Trade Marks  Office? 
If the  second sentence provides that each institution  must  act within 
the  limits of'  the  powers  conferred upon  it by the Treaty,  it may  not  exercise 
any other powers.  On  the other hand,  the  second subparagraph of Article 79(3), 
Article  121,  the fourth  subparagraph of Article  155  and  Article  172  expressly 
authorize the  Council to  confer powers  on  or delegate  powers  to other institutions. 
Moreover,  Articles 43(3),  75(1)(c),  84(2),  113(2)  and (4),  179  and 235  implicitly 
authorize the  Council to confer powers  on  itself or on  other institutions and 
on  existing and newly created Community  bodies.  The  second sentence of Article 
4(1) must,  therefore,  cover those  powers  which  the Treaty indirectly confers  on 
the institutions and bodies,  since it authorizes the  Council to  confer them  on 
itself' or on  other institutions and bodies  and hence  to  create  them.  Whether 
Article  235  contains a  like authority must  be  ascertained by interpreting 
that article (as was  done  at D III).  Nothing can  be  inferred in this respect, 
however,  from  Article 4(1).  On  the  contrary,  the  second sentence  ("within 
the  limits of") refers amongst  other things to  the  power  conferred on  the  Council 
by Article  235,  and therefore based on  the EEC  Treaty,  to take  "appropriate 
measures" with a  view to attaining a  Community  objective and hence,  if necessary, 
to confer on  the  Community  institutions and bodies  powers  that are new,  previously 
non-existent and therefore vested neither in itself nor the Member  States  • 
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The  fact  that the EEC  Treaty enumerates  the  powers  granted to the 
institutions does  not,  therefore,  rule out  the granting of new  powers  to 
them  or to Community  bodies.  The  sole point at issue here is the  exercise 
of a  power  conferred on  the  Council  by the Treaty,  and more  specifically 
by Article 235.  This  exercise of an  existing power  consisting in the  adoption 
of a  trade mark  regulation involves  the creation by the  Council of specific 
powers  (adoption of implementing regulations)  for itself (self conferment), 
others for  the  Commission  (particularly to amend  the  implementing regulations 
and to supervise  the  legality of the  various acts of management  of the Office), 
others for  the  Office  (notably to take  decisions  in trade mark  matters)  and 
others still (e.g.  the  hearing of appeals) for the  Court  of Justice.  As 
already indicated,  the  Council's  law-making powers  under Article  235  include 
the  power  to vest in the  Council,  the  Commission,  the  Court  of Justice  and 
other bodies the  right to exercise  powers  of application,  implementation  and 
legal protection,  which were  previously non-existent.· 
This makes it clear that  the  creation of a  Community  trade mark 
organization does not alter or add to the  EEC  Treaty,  but instead constitutes 
in  complete  conformity with Article 4(1) the carrying out of a  Community 
task  (see  C above)  by its institutions within the  limits of the  powers  conferred 
on  them  by the  Treaty and in particular by Article  235  {see  D above). 
For these reasons,  the  draft  Regulation  does not  provide for the 
transfer to  the  Community  of sovereign powers  of the Member  States.  A new 
transfer of additional powers  which are currently vested in the Member  States 
would not  be  covered by the  EEC  Treaty and could therefore only be  done  by a 
new  Treaty between the  Member  States  in conformity with their constitutional 
law.  Art:cle  235,  like other similar provisions,  {eg.  Article  100)  does  not 
authorize the  Community  institutions to assume  powers  which  are vested in the 
Member  States.  The  fact  is that the  EEC  Treaty (Article 235)  has  already 
conferred certain powers  on  the  institutions  (see also Article  100,  etc.). 
They may  avail themselves  of these  powers  at the  proper time.  If they do  so,  the 
competence  of the  Community  is not  extended to  a  new  field.  It is simply that the 
power  which already exists for this  purpose  is actually being exercised,  eo 
that the field in question  then becomes  governed by Community  law. 
Consequently,  as  soon  as  the  Treaty was  concluded,  or when  they acceded 
to it, the Member  States transferred to the  Council as  a  Community  institution 
the power  to take  appropriate measures  in the  trade mark  sphere  as well.  Article 
235  also ranks  among  those  provisions which  have  transferred to  the  Council not 
only the individual authorizations provided for in the  EEC  Treaty but also 
sovereign powers  of the  Member  States.  Since,  as  alrea~ indicated (see  D above), 
the  draft Regulation remains  within the bounds  of the measures  allowed under 
Article  235,  it is covered by an  authorization which  was  granted to  the  Community 
institutions as  long ago  as  1958.  The  time  at which  the  institutions avail 
themselves  of this authorization is immaterial. 
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2.  Position of the  Commission 
The  first sentence of Article 4(1)  provides that: 
"The  tasks entrusted to the  Community  shall be  carried out by the  following 
institutions: 
an  Assembly, 
a  Council 
a  Commission 
a  Court of Justice" 
The  Treaty makes  a  distinction between these four  Community 
"institutions" and "bodies established by an  act of the  Council"  {subparagraph 
c  of the first paragraph of Article  177).  It might  therefore be  concluded 
from  the first sentence of Article 4(1) that only an  "institution" and not 
a  "body"  may  carry out  Community  tasks. 
Such  listing of the "institutions",  however,  amounts  in no  way  to a 
topic argument.  In any event,  the  creation of a  Trade Marks  Office  does not 
constitute the  setting-up of an additional institution; it represents only the 
establishment of a  Community  body  (Article  118(1)  of the draft Regulation}. 
If, however,  there were  any substance in the  foregoing  line of argument,  not 
only would the  creation of new  bodies expressly provided for in the  Treaty 
(Article 40(3)  and  (4)) or merely authorized by it (Articles 43(3),  75(1)(c), 
84(2),  113(2) and  (4),  179  and 235)  be  inadmissible because  they have  been 
entrusted with specific tasks,  (Monetary Fund,  Centre,  Foundation)  but there 
would also be  a  conflict with existing,  independent bodies set up by the 
EEC  Treaty itself by reason of the  tasks entrusted to  them  by the  Treaty 
(Economic  and Social Committee,  Court  of Auditors,  European  Investment  Bank). 
Such  an  interpretation of the first sentence of Article 4(1),  at variance as it 
is with the  system of institutions and bodies enshrined in the  EEC  Treaty,  would 
be  incorrect. 
The  first sentence should rather be  read in conjunction with the 
second sentence.  This  states that each institution shall act  "within the 
limits of the  powers  conferred upon  it by this Treaty11 •  Article  235  also 
ranks  among  these  provisions which  confer powers.  As  already pointed out 
(see  D III above),  this article empowers  the  Council riot  only to  confer 
powers  on  other institutions but also to  create bodies and vest  them  with 
the necessary powers.  Article  177(1)(c) confirms that the  Treaty contains 
such authority.  If the  Council avails itself thereof it is acting within  the 
limits of a  power  conferred upon  it.  Article 4(1)  consequently does not itself 
confer on  the  Commission  the  power  to  implement  the  Regulation  on  trade marks, 
but in conjunction with Article 235  authorizes the  Council  to confer on  the 
Commission  or on  a  Trade  Marks  Office the  power  to carry out  this  Community 
task. 
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It remains  to  be  considered whether this conclusion is consistent 
with Article  155. 
II. Article  155 
1.  Position of the  Commission  under  the  first and third indents 
The  first part of Article  155  provides  that: 
"In order to  ensure  the  proper functioning and development  of the  common 
market,  the  Commission  shall: 
ensure  that the  provisions of this Treaty and  the measures  taken by the 
institutions pursuant  thereto are applied". 
Does  the  Commission  therefore have  to apply,  implement  and  execute 
the  trade mark  Regulation?  Or  is its task,  that is to  say its power  and duty, 
limited to ensuring its application by others,  i.e. national and Community 
bodies  including the Trade  Marks  Office? 
From  the  way  the provision is worded it would appear that  the  Commission 
has general authority to  implement  Regulations from  the administrative point of view, 
and this directly by virtue of the EEC  Treaty.  In so far as it is not qualified by 
the following indents,  the  ~revision therefore calls for the exercise of care and 
circumspection  when  organizing the  Community  trade mark  system. 
_  It is thus  doubtful whether  the  Commission's  task of ensuring "that 
{the regulatio!Y [J.iJ  applied" also  includes the taking of binding decisions 
addressed to  individuals  in the  common  market  (fourth paragraph of Article  189). 
The  third indent  of Article  155  makesthe  Commission's  task of having 
11its own 
power of decision"  subject  to  the  restriction "in the manner  provided for in 
this Treaty''•  The  decision-making power  therefore exists  only if it is conferred 
on  the  Commission  by a  Treaty provision.  This·restriction would be  rendered 
to all practical  purposes  invalid if the  Commission  has  decision-making power 
under the wider wording of the first indent of Article  155. 
This  provision  therefore  contains  a  general instruction to  the  Commission 
to  implement  regulations  from  the administrative point  of view.  The  Commission 
must  exert  an  influence  over the  Trade  Marks  Office  and be  in a  position at  least 
to  supervise it.  The  draft Regulation accordingly confers  on  the  Commission 
the  power  to appoint  and  dismiss senior staff of the  Office  and to assume  the 
legal supervision of the  management  of the Office  (Articles  126  and 127).  The 
Office  is also accountable  to it (Article  125(2)(d)).  The  first  indent of 
Article  155  does not,  however,  vest  anv decision-making powers  in the  Commission 
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and therefore  does not  limit the  Council's power  under Article  235 
to take  appropriate measures by conferring suitable decision-making powers 
on  the  Commission  and by creating a  body with its own  decision-making 
powers. 
2. Fourth indent 
(a)  Relationship to Article 235 
The  possession by the  Council of the  power  to  grant to  the  Commission 
(on  the basis of the authorizations to act  contained in the  EEC  Treaty, 
including Article  235)  the  right to  implement  regulations follows not  only 
as indicated from  the  wording and purpose  of Article  235  itself (see  D III 
1 and 2  above)  but also expressly from  the fourth indent of Article 155.  This 
provision states that: 
"In order to ensure  the proper functioning and  development  of the  common 
market,  the  Commission  shall:  ••• 
exercise the  powers  conferred on  it by the  Council for the implementation 
of the rules laid down  by the  latter". 
The  fourth indent of Article  155  therefore expressly provides that the 
Council may  lay down  rules in which it confers on  the  Commission  powers  to 
implement  those  ruaes.  Article 155  is, however,  not itself the  basis for the 
laying down  of such rules,  but  instead refers to the  various authorizations 
to act  o~tained in the EEC  Treaty.  One  of these authorizations is Article  235. 
b)  Implementation by means  of Commission  regulations 
It was  queried earlier whether  the  term  "implementation" also covers 
the power  to make  law in the  form  of implementing  ~egulations.  The  Court  of 
Justice  answered this question in the affirmative1l: 
"Both  the legislative scheme  of the  Treaty,  reflected in particular 'uy  the 
last indent  of Article 155,  and  the  consistent practice of the  Community 
institutions establish a  distinction,  according to the  legal concepts 
recognized in all the Member  States,  between the measures directly based on 
the Treaty itself and derived law  intended to  ensure  their implementation. 
It cannot  therefore  be  a  requirement  that all the  details of the regulations 
concerning the  common  agricultural policy be  drawn  up  by the  Council  according 
to  the  procedure  in Article 43.  It is sufficient for the purposes of that 
provision that the basic elements of the matter to be  dealt with have  been 
adopted in accordance  with the  procedure  laid down  by that provision.  On  the 
1 
)  Judgments  of the  Court  of Justice of 17  December  1970,  Case  25/70 "Koster" 
L}91Ql  ECR  1161- 1170,  Ground  6 
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other hand,  the  prov1s1ons  implementing the basic regulations may  be  adopted 
according to a  procedure  different from  that in Article 43,  either by the  Council 
itself or by the  Commission  by virtue of an  authorization complying with  Article 
155." 
According to  this well-established case-law and  to the practice of the 
Council  and  Commission,  it would  be  permissible to  confer on  the  Commission  the 
power  to adopt  the  implementing regulations,  the  rules of procedure of the 
Boards  of Appeal  of the Office  and the  regulations governing the fees  charged 
by the  Office if their substance  does not  "~o beyond  the  limits of the  implementation 
of the principles of the basic regulation"1J.  An  example  is provi4ed by the 
rules on  cartels,  concerning which  the  Court  of Justice held that21: 
"In Article  19  of Regulation No  17  the  Council  has  provided that .undertakings 
which were  parties  to  one  of the  procedures  provided for by that regulation shall 
have  the opportunity of being heard by the  Commission.  In Article 24  of the 
same  regulation the  Council has  conferred on  the  Commission  power  to adopt 
implementing provisions  concerni~ such hearings. £This happened in the  case 
of Commission  Regulation  No  99/61f.  Since  the  principle that the  persons 
concerned shall be  given  the opportunity of being heard by  the  Commission  was 
adopted by the  Council  the rules  laying down  the  procedure  to  be  followed in 
this connection,  however  important  they may  be,  constitute implementing 
provisions within the meaning of the above-mentioned Article 155.  Consequently 
it was  lawful for the  Council to entrust the  institution authorized to apply 
this procedure with the  task of laying down  its details." 
The  present  draft  of the trade mark  Regulation  adopts this solution 
for the  adoption  of amendments  to  the  implementing regulations  (Article  142(3)): 
"The  Commission  is authorized to adopt  amendments  to  the  implementing regulations 
on  the  recommendation  of the  Management  Committee.n 
The  Council  may  also reserve ::·or  itself the right to  adopt  the 
abovementioned  implementing regulations,  as is provided for  in the  present 
draft of the trade mark  Regulation  (Article  142(1)  and  (2))  except in the 
case  of the  amendments  just referred to  (Article  142(3)). 
c)  Implementation by means  of  Commission  decisions 
If it is therefore both permissible  and consistent with established 
practice to confer on  the  Commission  the  power  to  adopt  regulations  implementing 
basic regulations,  it is a  fortiori  permissible to  confer  on  it the  power  to 
address  to persons in the  common  market  the  decisiqns specified in the basic 
regulation.  In the words  of the  Court  of Justice3J: 
1 ) 
Loc.  cit. Ground 7. 
2)  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice  of  15  July 1970,  Case  41/69  "ACF  Chemiefarma11 
/J97rj}  ECR  661  ...  688,  Grounds  63-66. 
3)  11 ACF  Cherniefarma"  - decision  loc. cit  o  Ground  62 
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"Article  155 ••••  does not restrict this authority fPursuant  to Article 87  to 
give effect to the principles of cartel  law  by means  of Council  regulation~ 
to powers  other than  those of drawing up  regulations." 
Article  155  therefore  covers  the  Commission's  authority to take 
decisions. 
In  point of fact,  regulations  amount  to the making of  law while 
decisions constitute application of the  law.  The  former  are addressed to all 
citizens of the  common  market,  the  latter to individuals.  The  former  involve 
the  legislative enforcement  of the  principles of the basic regulation.  the 
latter their administrative enforcement  in individual cases •. This  clearly 
constitutes "implementation" of the basic regulation made  by the  Council  in 
the strict sense of the word.  The  only thing that has ever been  in doubt  is 
whether  "implementation" also  includes  the exercise of legislative powers,  and 
in this connection,  on  the meaning of the word  "implementation",  the  Court  of 
Justice held that: 
"When  Article  155  of the Treaty provides that  'the Commission  shall exercise 
the  powers  conferred on it by the  Council for the  implementation of the  rules 
laid down  by the  latter', it follows  from  the  context of the Treaty in which it 
must  be  placed and  also from  practical requirements that  the  concept  of 
implementation must  be  given  a  wide  interpretation  •••  the  Council may  be  led 
to confer on  the  Commission  wide  powers  of discretion and  action." 
In  the  light of this binding interpretation,  there  can be no  objection 
to conferring on  the  Commission  the  power  to  take decisions  concerning the 
legality of a  disputed act of1he  President of the  Office  (Article  127(3) of 
the draft).  This power  is also in keeping with the general instruction to the 
Commission  laid down  in the firs·t  indent  of Article 155.  It would be no  less 
permissible to confer on  it the  power  to take all other decisions in trade mark 
matters conferred on  the  Trade  Marks  Office under the  present draft of the 
Regulation. 
Indeed,  the fourth  indent of Article  155  makes  no  distinction  be tworm 
the various types of  implementing powers  which  the  Council  can  transfer to  the 
Commission  and  therefore  covers all acts allowed under  the  Treaty,  including 
regulations,  directives and decisions.  The  provision is proof that the Member 
States did not  wish to  lay down  definitively in the  Treaty the fields in which 
the  Commission  has. power  to  take decisions  in individual cases.  This  depends 
rather,  in each particular case,  on  whether  and  to what  extent the  Council uses 
the  authority conferred on  it by the  Treaty.  Article 88  confirms this in the 
1)  Judgment  of the  Court  of Justice of 30  October 1975 "Rey  Soda"  23/75 - ECR 
197 5,  1279  13001  Grounds  10  and  11 • 
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field of cartels by  empowering  the authorities of the Member  States to 
implement  Articles 85  and 86  pending entry into  force  of the  provisions 
adopted under Article 8(.  Article  235  authorizes the  conferment  of 
implementing powers  on  the  Commission  or on  some  other agency only where 
such action by the  Community  proves necessary and appropriate for the 
attainment of one  of its objectives. 
d)  Implementation  by means  of decisions of a  Trade Marks  Office 
The  fourth  indent  of Article  155  of the  Treaty does not  automatically 
and generally confer on  the  Commission  the  power  to  implement  the rules  laid 
down  by the  Council.  It merely enables  the  Council to confer such 
implementing powers  on  the  Commission  in individual cases.) The  use  by the 
Council of  the fourth  indent of Article  155  is "optional"1  • 
In addition to this,  the administrative  implementation of Community 
Regulations  by Community  institutions  or bodies  is necessary only in quite 
exceptional cases.  As  a  rule,  action by national authorities and courts is 
sufficient.  It has  already been explained (at  D I  3(c)and  IV  above)  why  the 
implementation of the  trade mark  Regulation calls for  the  setting-up of a 
trade marks  organization at  Community  level. 
For these  reasons,  the fourth  indent of Article  155  gives the  Council 
ample  room  for manoeuvre.  Does  the  provision  prevent it from  conferring power 
to take  decisions in individual  cases  pursuant  to  Article 235  on  a  Community 
body set up for  that purpose? 
The  wording and purpose of  Article  155  do  not  preclude this.  The 
provision  describes  the  Commission's  tasks,  but  reserves for it alone only 
the  tasks  described in subparagraphs  1,  2  and  3.  Whether  and to what  extent 
the  Council  confers  on  the  Commission  the  power  to  perform executive tasks 
in individual cases depends  on  the need for execution by the  Community,  the 
extent  of the authorization to  act in question and  the  Council's discretion. 
Article  235  provides that "action by the  Community"  must  also·prove necessary 
in the field of execution.  The  article  leaves  open  the  question  as  to  who 
should act in such circumstances,  i.e. a  Community  institution or body.  The 
measures  taken must,  however,  be  "appropriate".  The  question whether the 
conferring on  the  Commission  or on  a  Community  body of power  to  take 
decisions in individual trade mark  matters is an  "appropriate" measure  is 
therefore  decided by  the  Council  on  a  proposal from  the  Commission  under 
1)  "Koster"  judgment,  lac. cit.,  1171,  Ground  9.  Cf.  also the  above  quotation 
from  the  "Rey  Sodan  judgment. 
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Article 235.  Here,  however,  the  Council is not free to  exercise its 
discretion but is bound by the fact that the f'ourth indent of Article 155 
can be  interpreted as an invitation to the Council to charge the  Commission 
in the ordinary course of things with the administrative execution of Council 
Regulations by means  of individual decisions.  The  article does not  contain 
a  hard and fast rule,  however,  but allows certain exceptions where  they are 
warranted by the circumstances and this would  include execution by a  Trade 
Marks  Office within the limits provided for in the basic regulation. 
III. Clearly defined executive powers 
In the Meroni  judgments, the  Court  of Justice 
decided that the delegation of decision-making powers  to bodies was  subject 
to certain limitations.  The  relevance ofihese to the proposed European 
trade mark  system will now  be  examined. 
Subparagraph  (b) of the first paragraph of Article 53  of the ECSC 
Treaty provides that: 
"the High  authority /jow the  Commissio!Y' may  a)  ••••••  b) with the unanimous 
assent of the  Council,  itself make  any financial arrangements  serving the 
same  purposes LPerformance  of the economic  tasks of the High  Authority set out 
in Article iJ." 
On  the  strength of this authorization,  the  High  Authority created an 
equalization .mechanism for scrap imported from  non-member  countries and 
delegated to it, financial  powers  of general and individual scope. 
The  Court held that1): 
"••• under Article 53  as regards  the execution of the financial  arrangements 
mentioned therein,  it is only the  delegation of those powers  "necessary for 
the performance of the tasks set out in Article  3"  which may  be  authorized. 
Such  delegations of powers,  however,  can only relate to clearly defined executive 
powers,  the use of which must  be  entirely subject to the supervision of the 
High  Autho~i~.  •••• the delegation of powers  granted to the Brussels agencies 
/_Or  the bod:j/  gives  those agencies  a  degree of lati"tude which  implies a  wide 
margin of discretion and cannot  be  considered as  compatible with the 
requirements of the Treaty." 
1)  Judgment  of the  Court of Justice of 13  June  1958,  Cases  9/56 and 10/56 
"Maroni" /J957  and 195§7 ECR  133  at 152  and 154,  157  .:..  173  and 175• -42-
If one  judges the  proposed conferment  of decision-making powers 
on the Trade Marks  Office according to these criteria, the following 
conclusions  can be  drawn: 
The  Office is a  technical body. Its task is to  execute the Commu-
nity's trade mark  law,  which  calls for  special expertise. It takes specific 
individual decisions  addressed to  persons in the common  market.  All  decisions 
of the Office - namely  those  concerning applications for Community  trade 
marks,  opposition by proprietors of earlier trade marks,  the registration, 
lapse  and cancellation of Community  trade marks,  costs,  appeals  and 
restitution - are taken on  the basis of detailed provisions of the trade 
mark  Regulation which define the manner  in which it is to be  put  into 
effect  (see the article of the draft Regulation quoted at B above).  The 
Office has merely to  examine  whether the characteristics of such provisions 
of the regulation as  may  from  time to  time  be  applicable  correspond to  the 
facts of the case in point.  This is a  task of pure classification. These 
provisions do  not  allow "a degree of latitude" or "a wide  margin of 
discretion",  let alone  an  opportunity to  execute  an  "economic  policy" l)  .• 
The  Court  of Justice will  examine  the decisions of the Boards of Appeal  of 
the Office for errors of law.  The  Commission  will  assume  the legal super-
vision of the management  of the Office  (see B above  for further details). 
The  Office will not  have the  power  to make  regulations. 
It follows  from  this that the draft Regulation confers  on  the 
Office only "implementing powers"  which  are "clearly defined",  whose 
exercise is "supervised"  by  the Court  of Justice or the Commission 
and  which do  not  allow the Office  any "discretionary pojer"  involving 
a  "wide  margin of discretion". 
Moreover,  the Court  of Justice has  continued-to develop its 
case-law with regard to Article 75(l)(c)  of the EEC  treaty. In its opinion 
on  the European  Laying-Up Fund  for  Inland Waterway Vessels  already referred 
to  (at D III  3  above),  which is to be  empowered  to address decisions to 
individuals,  the Court  of Justice pointed out  the  problems  inherent in 
the vesting in the Fund  of)legislativ powers  belonging to the Community 
institutions,  and stated 2  : 
ttHowever,  it is unnecessary in this opinion to solve the  problem thus 
posed.  In fact  the  provisions of the Statute define  and  limit the  powers 
which  the latter grants to the  organs of the Fund  so  clearly and  precisely 
that in this case they are  only executive  powers.  Thus  the field in which 
the  organs  may  take action is limited to  the  sphere of the voluntary 
laying-up of the excess  carrying capacity subject to the condition that 
financial  compensations  is paid by  a  Fund  financed by contributions levied 
on  the vessels using the inland waterways  covered by the Fund  •••  The 
Fund  may  not  be  used  with the  aim  of fixing a  permanent  minimum  level for 
.;. 
l)  The  Court  of Justice uses  these terms  in the Meroni  judgments, 
loc.  cit.,  pp.  154  and  175 
2)  Court  of Justice,  26  April  1977,  Opinion  l/76,  OJ  No.  C 107  of .3  May  1977, 
p.  4  - 14  and  15,  paragraph 16. -43-
freight  rates during all periods of slack demand  or of remedying structural 
imbalance. More  particularly,  the rate of contributions  •••  for the first 
year of the operation of the system is laid down  in the actual terms of 
the Statute and subsequent  amendments  by decision of the Supervisory Board 
must  either remain within certain limits or result from  a  unanimous 
decision." 
The  individual decisions  (e.g.  on  compensation}  based  on  this 
clearly present  no  problems.  A closer inspection of the  proposed  provisions 
of the Statute of the Fund  reveals,  however,  a  very  flexibl~ development 
of the strict criteria laid down  in the Meroni  judgments. lJ 
IV.  Affording of legal protection 
1. Conferring of powers  expressly,  disclosure of reasons  on  which  decisions 
are based,  management  report of operations 
Three  further limits must,  according to the Meroni  judgments, 
be respected  when  conferring powers  on  agencies. 
First, "a delegation of powers  cannot  be  preswned  and  ••• the  2) 
delegating authority must  take an  express decision transferring them." 
This condition is complied with in the draft Regulation on trade marks. 
Secondlx,  the agency's decisions must  state the reasons  on  which 
they are based 3J.  This obligation is in keeping with Article 190 of the 
EEC  Treaty:  " •••• decisions of the Council  and  of the Commission  shall 
state the reasons  on  which they are based  •••  " 
A corresponding provision is incorporated in the proposal  for  a 
Regulation on trade marks. 
Thirdly,  the agency must  publish a  management  report  each year 4) 
The  draft Regulation on  trade marks  makes  provision for this in Article 
125  (2)  (d). 
.; . 
l) Cf.  OJ  No.  C 208  of 3 September  1976,  pp.  2  and 8,  Articles  10 1  19,  20  and  23. 
2)  Judgment  in Case  9/56  11Meroni" 1  loc. cit.  1  p.  151. 
3)  11Meroni"  judgments,  loc. cit., PP•  149  and  164. 
4)  "Meroni"  judgments,  loc. cit. -44-
2.  Appeal  proceedings:  Trade Marks  Office, Boargsof:Appeal,  Court  of Juetice 
An  appeal  will lie from  decisions of the various divisions of the 
Trade Marks  Office  (Articles  63  to 66  of the draft regUlation)  to the Boards 
of Appeal  of the Office which will  each consist of three legally qualified, 
independent  members  (Articles 139,  140  and  68). A further  appeal  to the 
Court of Justice will lie from  decisions of the Boards of Appeal  (Article 69(1)). 
The  Court  of Justice will  examine  only points of law  (second sentence of 
Article 69(2)). 
The  model  for this appeals  procedure  (Trade Marks  Office  - Board 
of Appeal  - Court  of Justice)1ts taken from  the Convention for the European 
patent  for the  common  market  •  There  is general  agreement  that  in trade 
mark matters too  the direct hearing of appeals by the Court  of Justice would 
be neither possible nor desirable in view of the. very large number  of them. 
It would  be  unsatisfactory, if the Court,  which is the supreme  judicial 
authority of the Community,  were  to be  overburdened with  an  excessive number 
of cases  which involve questions  of fact.  It is important that the review 
procedure  afforded by the Court  of Just~ce be  confined to questions of law 
and take the form  of further  appeals.  2)  For these reasons the interposition 
of an  intermediate review body for questions of fact  and  of law is considered 
indispensable. 
'l'he  Meroni  judgments require,  however  1  that the actions of the 
body  entrusted with this task be  subject to  judicial control  equivalent 
to that  provided for  in Article 173 of the EEC  Treaty. Do  the  contra~ 
exercised by the Boards  of Appeal  and the following of further appeals  to 
the Court  of Justice  from  their decisions offer the same  guarantees  as 
those  which  the  Court  of Justice  could provide  in regard to appeals  on 
,points of fact  and  of law  from  decisions of the  Commission  ? 
The  !lieroni  judgments  decided that coal  and  steel undertakings 
should  be  protected and  that their rights  should not  be  undermined.  This 
had  in fact  occurred because  a  decision-making power  of the High  Authority 
had  been  delegated to  another  body.  Persons  who  are subject to the  laws 
of the  common  market  should be  able  to rely on  there  being no  withdrawal 
by  the  secondary legislation of the Community,  of the protection afforded. 
by the treaty itself in respect  of the field governed  by it. 
.; . 
l)  OJ  No.  L  17  of 26.1.1976, Articles  62  and  63. 
2)  Proposals  made  by  the  Court  of Justice on  measures  to  ensure the 
proper  performance of its tasks,  31  January 1979,  page  2,  Annex  to 
Council Document  4679/79  (JUR  36)  of 7 February 1979. - 45  -
The  European trade mark  system  does  not  yet exist and  the Treaty makes  no 
provision for it. A form  of legal protection which hitherto did not exist 
under the Treaty. is to be  created with the help of Article 235.  This protection 
fulfils the special technical  requirements  of trade mark  law  and is "necessary'' 
and "appropriate".  It is moreover in the interests of the citizens of the 
common  market  that a  suitable system be established.  This calls for three 
authorities,  and not an exact  copy of the  EEC  Treaty,  which  offers only two. 
Two  of these three authorities would  have  special technical qualifications 
and experience in trade mark  matters.  Under  a  two-stage procedure this would 
be true only of the first authority - the appropriate division of the Trade 
Marks  Office.  The  Court  of Justice would be less well  equipped to examine 
the facts and hear evidence  than the Boards  of Appeal,  which  specialize in 
such matters.  The  legal protection of the parties concerned,  which was  the 
overriding consideration in the Meroni  judgments,  can thus be  ensured in trade 
mark  matters,  in the framework  of Article  235,  in a  different way,  and more 
effectively,  than py referring decisions of the first authority to the 
Commission,  followed automatically by a  full  review by the Court  of Justice 
(Article 173).  Compared  with a  two-stage solution,  the three-stage solution 
not  only maintains the legal protection of the citizen at its present level 
but actually increases it. 
V.  Safeguarding the institutional structure of the Community  and the balance 
of powers 
The  Court  of Justice said,  on  this subject that1): 
"The  objectives set out  in Article  :~  of the ECSC  Treaty are binding not  only 
on  the High  Authority,  but  on  the  11 institutions of the Community  •••  within 
the  limits of their respective powers,  in the  common  interest".  From  that 
provision there  can be  seen in the balance of powers which is characteristic 
of thP.  institutional structure of  t~e Community  a  fundamental  guarantee 
granted by the Treaty in particular to the undertakings  •••  to which it 
applies." 
Thig  principle should also be borne in mind  in the European Economic 
Community.  Article 3 of the ECSC  Treaty,  in the  way  in which  the Court  of 
Justice refers to it  here,  is comparable  to Article 4 of the EEC  Treaty 
(see text at  I  above).  In the Koster judgment  the Court  expressly confirmed 
that,  when  secondary legislation of the  Community  was  being adopted,  "the 
Community  structure2f:d the institutional balance"  should not be "distorted". 
In the Court's view  ,even when  an  international body managed  by the EEC  and 
a  non-member State was  being set up 
...  I ... 
l)  "Meronin  judgments,  loc.cit.,  pp.  152  and 173. 
2)  Court  of Justice,  26  April  1977,  Opinion 1/76- European  Laying-Up Fund 
for Inland Waterway Vessels- OJ  No  C 107  of 3  May  1977,  p.  4  - 14, 
paragraph 14. - 46-
"an appropriate balance in the  composition of the organs  of the Fund  ••• 
must  not  result in weakening the institutions of the Community  •••  even 
for a  specific and  limited objective". 
l. Position of the  Court  of Justice 
The  conferring on  Boards  of Appeal  of the Office of power to take 
decisions in respect  of appeals might  arouse  objections were  the Court  of 
Justice to have  the sole right under the EEC  Treaty to give  judgment at 
Community  level. 
Article 164  charges the Court  of Justice to ensure "that  .• • •  the 
law  is observed".  This necessarily involves  reviewing the decisions of 
subordinate authorities in regard to errors of law,  but not  the repetition 
of complicated statements of facts. 
This  contention is supported in the first place by the fact that 
Article 179  permits the creation of an1,dministrative tribunal  of the European 
Co~unities under the  Court  of Justi0e  •  The  Commissinn  ~,s recently proposed 
to the Council  the adoption of  a  regulation  t~)this effect  The  Court has 
expressed its views  on  this matter as follows  : 
"  the Court  of Justice has  examined the  proposal for a  Regulation submitted 
by the  Commission  and entirely approves  in principle the setting up  of  an 
administrative tribunal with the task of settling at first instance disputes 
between the  Communities  and their employees. 
The  Court  takes the  view that,  since an action for annulment  of the decisions 
of such a  tribunal will be  available before the  Court  of Justice,  the require-
ments  of Article 179  of the  EEC  Treaty and  the parallel provisions of the 
other two  Treaties will be  satisfied and that the new  tribunal  can therefore 
be set up  within the  framework  of the Staff Regulations of Officials.  The 
Court also feels that the structure of the tribunal  and the procedural  provisions 
laid down  in the Commission's proposal  comply with the essential requirements 
of Community  law". 
.  . / ... 
l)  Article 179  provides:  "The  Court  of Justice shall have  jurisdiction in 
any dispuite between the Community  and  its servants within the limits and 
under the conditions laid down  in the Staff Regulations or the Conditions 
2) 
of Employment."  As  already indicated (see D III above)  Article  235  contains 
a  much  more  extensive power. 
Proposal  for a  Council  Regulation  establishing an Administrative 
Tribunal  of the European  Communities,  OJ  No  C 225  of  22  September 1978,  p.  6 
3)  Letter from  its Preisdent to the President  of the Council  dated 27  September 
1978,  Council  document  R/2522/78  (JUR  156)  of 4  October 1978. - 47-
The  second indication is the fact that in the Euratom Treaty provision 
is made  for an additional  body  (not yet created) with  judicial functions,  namely 
the Arbitration Committee  under Article 18.  It is intended that this Committee 
should have  optionaj~risdiction in addition to that of the courts of the 
Member  States over the grant of patent and utility model  licenses in the field 
of nuclear energy.  It consists of fifteen people who  exercise  judicial 
responsibilitt1s.  It sits in the form  of arbitration boards consisting of 
three members  •  Appeals  from  its decisions,  which  are addressed to individuals, 
lie to the Court  of Justice  (second paragraph of Article 18).  Its decisions 
have  the force  of res  judicata between the parties concerned  and are enforceable 
(third paragraph of Article 18). 
The  setting-up in a  third sector of intellectual property of a  specialized 
authority under the Court  of Justice which  relieves the latter of the task of 
examining facts is therefore compatible with the requirement  of "appropriate" 
(Article  235),  legal protection (meaning effective legal protection)  and with 
the "institutinnal structure of the Community"  and the "balance of powers" 
(Meroni,  Koster).  The  essential thing is that the Court  of Justice should have 
power  to  review decisions  of the Boards of Appeal  by way  of a  further appeal 
on  a  point of law. 
In order that such  judicial control may  also be  exercised in cases in wlich 
the parties do  not  appeal  against decisions,  which  are of dubious  legal validity, 
it is stipulated that the Advocate-General at the  Court  of Justice m~  lodge 
a  further appeal  on  a  point of law to the  Court  (Article 70(1)).  This ensures 
that in relation to the Community's  trade mark  law the  Court  of Justice can 
fully perform the task imposed upon it by the Treaty of "ensuring that the law 
is observed". 
So  long as this is so,  and in particular so long as the Court  of Justice 
is able to ensure  the uniform application of the  Community's  trade mark  law 
and  thereby perform its role as supreme  custodian of the  law,  its position 
as  a  Community  institution will not be distorted and  the balance between 
itself as authority which  interprets the law  and the Trade marks  Office as the 
authority which  enforces the  law will not be  disturbed.  The  balance will, 
on  the  contrary,  be maintained and  consolidated by means  of the Boards 
of Appeal,  each  of which will have  three legally expert,  independent members 
and be  similar to a  court of law. 
As  far as the  institutio~'l questinn is concerned,  the  Court  of Justice 
has itself commented  as follows  : 
... / ... 
l) Cf.  for further details Regulation No  7/63/Euratom of the  Council  of 
3  December  1963,  OJ  No  180  of 10  December  1963,  p.  21349. 
2)  Proposals  on  European Union in Reports  on  European Union,  Bulletin 
of the European Communities,  Supplement  9/75,  p.  17  - 20. - 48  -
"Because  of the need to ensure  uniform application of the  law in all the 
Member  States, it is of fundamental  importance that the  judicial system 
should be  subject to a  single supreme  court.  Any  ne\-7  structure involving 
the  coexistence of a  number  of separate or competing courts must  therefore 
be  avoided. 
Indeed,  with  a  view to ensuring that in the interpretation and application 
of the Treaties the  law is observed,  the  jurisdiction of the Court  should 
be  extended to cover any new  powers  to be  exercised by the institutions. 
It is therefore of the first importance that there should be  one  indpendent 
Community  court". 
2.  Position of the Commission 
It remains  to be  discussed whether the setting-up of a  Trade  Marks 
Office with decision-making powers  vis-a-vis citizens of the  common  market 
would "render ineffective" or "distort" the "institutional structure of the 
Community"  or the "Community structure" and  the "balance of forces"  or the 
"institutional balanoe". 
In the Maroni  judgments,  the Court  of Justice held that the security 
inherent in those  concepts was  rendered ineffective where  the  body~s not  l) 
provided for in the ECSC  Treaty and where  the power  delegated was  discretionary  : 
"To  delegate  a .discretionary power,  by entrusting it to bodies other than 
those which the Treaty has established to effect and supervise the exercise 
of such power  each within the limits of its own  authority,  would  render that 
guarantee ineffective". 
It is not  intended,  however,  that any discretionary powers  be  conferred 
on the Trade Marks  Office.  This has  already been stated in detail  (see III 
above).  The  sentence quoted does not  a~ply,  therefore to the present case. 
Consequently,  the Trade Marks  Office,  although not  expressly provided 
for in the Treaty,  can be  created. 
. ..  f ... 
l) Judgment  of 13  June  1958,  Cases  9/56  and  10/56  "Maroni"  /J95§7 
ECR  133  -·.  152  and  157  - 173. - 49-
The  establishment of a  Trade  Marks  Office  and  the  conferr.ing on  it 
of decision-making power vis-&-vis  individuals might be  objected to if the 
EEC  Treaty had  given to the Commission  a  monopoly in the matter of implementation 
at Community  level.  It has  already been explained at length why  this is not 
so  (see  I  2  and II above).  The  following points however,  should also be 
noted. 
The  Trade Marks  Office is intended not as a  new  institution but  as a 
Community  body supervised from  the  legal  point of view by the  Commission. 
The  institutional structure of the Community  and the balance between the 
four institutions will  remain unaffected.  There will be no  transfer of 
authority between the Council  and  the Commission.  The  organizational 
structure of the  Community will,  of course,  be enlarged but this will be 
achieved without  modifying the  system,  without reorganization,  reform  or 
alteration of the distribution of powers  among  the institU[ons. 
Secondly,  the  powers  which  are to be  conferred on  the  Trade Marks 
Office are not currently vested in the  Council,  Commission  and Court  of 
Justice  (or the Member  States).  No  abandonment  or delegation of existing 
powers  is planned.  No  one  will be forfeiting a  power vested in him  in favour 
of another.  Insteai,  the Council will merely be using the power conferred 
on it by the Member  States under Article  235  of the Treaty to create bodies 
and  confer powers  on  them.  What  is being established,  therefore,  is a  new 
Office with new  rights and  obligatinns.  The  distribution of powers  among 
the  Community  institutions and  the  balanc(~ between  them  (and  between  the 
Comr.tuni ty and  the  Member  States) will  remain  unchanged. 
Thirdly,  the Trade Marks  Office is to receive no  legislative powers. 
These  remain reserved for the  Council  and  Commission  (see II 2  a  and  b  above 
for further details)!)  This  ensures  compliance with the Koster decision of 
the  Court  of Justice  • 
Fourthly,  the  Trade Marks  Office is to receive no  power  to address decisions 
decisions to Member  States.  It will be  granted solely the power  to address 
to citizens of the  common  market.  It has already been pointed out  that under 
Article 155  the Commission  has no  monopoly over such  decisions  (see II 2  d 
above). 
Fifthly,  the  Trade Marks  Office is to  be  monitored in many  respects 
by the  Commission.  It will have  to report back to the Commission  each year 
about  its activities;  its senior staff will be appointed and dismissed by 
the  Commission;  senior staff will be  subject to the  Commission's disciplinary 
authority;  the management  of the Office will be  subject to the  legal  super-
vision of the  Commission;  th.e  latter will be  obliged to take action in the 
event  of any infringement  of Community  law;  Member  States and third pmties 
directly and  personally concerneq will be able to demand  an examination of 
the legality of any act of the  ~resident of the Office. 
.  .. I ... 
l)  Judgment  of the Court  of Justice of 17  December  1970,  Case  25/70  Ll9727 
ECR  1161  -·  1171,  Ground  9. - 50  -
Sixthly,  the  legality of the  acts of the  Commission  and hence  also of 
those  of the  Trade  Marks  Office will be  reviewed in turn by the Court  of Justice. 
If the  Commission  fails in its duty to supervise the Office,  or if it takes 
an unjust decision or fails to take any decision at all,  an action m~y be 
brought  against it by the Member  3ates or by those directly and personally 
concerned (Articles 173  and 175  of the .·EEC  Treaty).  The  draft Regulation, 
in conjunction with the Treaty,  therefore contains a  comprehensive  system 
of safeguards  designed to protect Community  law and,  in particular,  the 
rights  of individuals,  via the performance by the Office ofits functions. 
Seventhly,  the  Trade Marks  Office will be  subject to the budgetary rules 
of the  Communities.  Its expenditure will be  financed out  of their budget  and its 
income  from  fees will  flow into it.  The  Office will therefore be subject to 
the control  of the Council  and European Parliament provided for in the EEC 
Treaty and in the budgetary provisions contained in the secondary legislation. 
The  Court  of Auditors of the  Community  will monitor the administration of its 
finances. 
In view of all theforegoing,  it is clear that the creation of the 
Trade Marks  Office in the  form  of a  Community  body does not adversely affect, 
encroach upon  or distort the positionsof the four Community  institutions 
created by the Treaty.  On  the contrary,  it respects them  fully.  Moreover, 
the Office fits harmoniously into the institutional structure of the Community 
without  jeopardizing either its technical  and administrative  independence  or 
the  independence  of its staff. 
F.  Need  for a  Regulation 
The  question  has  repeatedly been raised whether it would  be more 
appropriate if action were  taken,  not by the  Community  on  the basis of its 
power  under Article  235  of the  EEC  Treaty in the  form  of a  Council  Regulation, 
but by the Member  States on  the basis of their treaty-making powers  as subjects 
of international  law. 
I. Historical background 
1.  Trade  mark  law 
The  historical background to the  Community  trade mark  will first of all 
be  outlined in order to explain why  the conclusion of a  convention was  advocated. 
On  19  December  1960,  the  senior. officials of the six original Member  States 
responsible for the  protection of industrial property rights stated that they 
considered it "appropriate to draw  up  a  draft convention creatinf)a European 
trade mark  law  that will exist side by side with national  laws".  They 
had already come  to the conclusion on  19  November  1959  that an  approximation 
of national trade mark  laws  pursuant to Article 100  was  both possible and 
necessary,  but that it would2
~ot be  an adequate  means  of attaining the 
objectives of the  EEC  Treaty·  • 
.  .. / ... 
l)  EEC 1  Commission,  Directorate-General for competition,  Doc,  IV/6739/3/60, 
p.  3 at II l. 
2)  EEC 7  Commission,  Directorate-General  for Competition,  minutes  of the 
meeting of 19  November  1959  on  the  introduction of the  approximation  of 
laws  in the field of the protection of industria.l nrot)ert:v rights, 
Doc.  IV/5697/59,  p.  3-11. -51 -
It was  therefore agreed on  19  December  1960  that "on the  one  hand the national 
laws  governing the protection of industrial property rights  •••  should be 
approximated,  while  on  the  other three draft cony,ntions  on  patents,  trade 
marks  and industrial designs  should be  drawn  up"  . •  The  view was  that 
"simplification and unification to the extent  e~jisaged can be  fully achieved 
only by means  of the conclusion of conventions"  •  Reference was  also made 
to "the limited scope  of the  Rome  Treaty's provisions on  the protection of 
industrial property and  the  advantages  ot be  gained  fr~' opening up  the 
planned conventions to accession by non-member States"  • 
However,  none  of these three points was  examined in greater detail. 
With  regard to the last point,  the Member  States and the  Commission 
came  to the conclusion some  time ago  that the inclusion of non-member  countries 
in the  Community  trade mark  system is undesirable.  This is because from  the 
economic  and legal points of view  an autnnomous,  unitary trade mark  is necessary 
only for the territory of the Member  States.  Only there  do  conditions similar 
to those  prevailing in an internal market have to be  created.  The  practicability 
of the system would be seriously jeopardized,  moreover,  by  the  existence of  ~) 
even greater number  of prior rights conflicting with the Community  trade mark  • 
Consequently,  subsequent  accession will be possible  (as well  as necessary) 
only in the  case of States that become  members  of the European Economic 
Community.  In  th~' respect the position is the  same  as in the case of the 
Community  patent.  The  possibility of participation by European non-member 
States which create a  customs union or a  free  tr~'e area with the  Community 
might nevertheless be  considered at a  later dat7)  •  The  position here is 
the same  as in the case of the  Community  patent  • 
l) See  Doc.  IV/6739/3/60  referred to above,  p.  l 
2)  loc.  cit. 
3)  loc.  eit. 
.  .. I ... 
4)  Cf.,  for further details,  Memorandum  on  the creation of an  EEC  trade mark, 
Bulletin of the European Communities,  Supplement  8/76,  p.  18,  points  58 
and 59· 
5)  Cf.  Article  95  of the  Community  Patent  Convention,  OJ  No  L 17  of 
26  January 1976,  p.  25. 
6)  Memorandum,  loc.  cit. 
7)  Cf.  Article 96  of the  Community  Patent  Convention,  loc.  cit. -52-
Such  a  determination of the conditions  and details for applying 
the rules governing the  Community  trade mark  to a  non-member  State is possible, 
however,  not only if the matter is dealt with by means  of a  convention between 
the Member  States but  also if it is dealt Nith by means  of a  Community  Regulation. 
Rules  embodied  in regulations or directives may  also subsequently be  extended 
in an appropriate manner  to cover one  or more  non-member  rruntries by means 
of an agreement  between  the Community  and those  countries  • 
As  far as the first and second points  of the proposals put forward 
in 1960  by the senior · officials of the six Member  States are  concerned,  the 
record shows  that at that time nobody had thought  of Article  235  and the 
new  instrument of  a  Council  regulation as an alternative to the traditional 
method  of a  convention.  This is understandable becausein 1959  and 1960  even 
the  customs union had not yet been set up. 
The  direction that the work  took  twenty years ago  cannot therefore be 
regarded as  a  preliminary decision not  to apply Article  235.  The  senior 
officials would  in any case not have  been  competent  to take  such  a  decision. 
It is solely for the Community  institutions {i.e., pending submission of a 
proposal,  the  Commission,  then the European Barliament  and  afterwards the 
Council)  to decide whether Article  235  applies (see D before I  above).  As 
regards the  only article to be  discussed in detail at that time,  namely 
Article 100,  the  abcve position wa~)made clear by the appropriate Member  of 
the Commission  as  long ago  as 1955)  and it was  acknowledged in the informal 
decisions  of the senior of!}cials  •  A further attempt to clarify the 
situation was  made  in 1963  •  In 1965,  the various Governments  involved 
suspended the work.  Towards  the end of 1972  the nine Heads  of State and  ) 
of Government  recomrnen2.ed  that Article  235  be  used "as widely as possible"5  • 
This  gave  rise to  a  new  situation from  the political point  of view also. 
Accordingly,  the  Commission  announced  in }~y 1973  that it was  then seeking 
a  Community  solution and that the publication of the 1964  preliminary draft 
did not  me~ that a  preliminary decision had  been taken in favour of a 
convention  •  In 1976,  it explained  i~~reater depth the reasons why it was 
advocating the adoption of a  regulation 
... / ... 
l) Cf.,  for example,  Article  29  of Directive 73/239/EEC  of  24  July 19731 
OJ  No  L 228  of 16  August  1973,  p.  3  - 14  and  the draft of the "Agreement 
between the Swiss  Confaderation and  the European Economic  Community  on 
direct  insurance other than life assurance",  consolidated text of 
21  June  1979. 
2)  Cf.  Doc.  IV/5697/59 referred to above,  p.  11 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Loc.  cit. Annex  l,  p.  2  and  Annex  2,  p.  4  par.  3b. 
Minutes  of the meeting of  21  October 1963,  Doc,  11726/IV/63,  pp.  3-4,  12 
Point 15  of the declaration issued at the  conference held in Pcris  on 
19  and  20  October 1972,  Bulletin of the European Communities  10/1972,  p.  23 
EC,  Commission,  Preliminary Draft  of a  Convention for a  European  Trade  Mark, 
Luxembourg,  1973,  p.  4 
7)  Memorandlli~ on  the  creation of an  EEC  trade mark,  Bulletin of the European 
Communities,  Supplement  8/76,  pp.  15-16. - 53-
It pointed out at the same  time  that the  Community  law-making procedure 
afforded all interested parties at least as  good  anopportunity to  ac~)re 
information and enter into consultations as the inter-State procedure  • 
Experience gained in the  course  of the preparation of the draft  regulation 
appears since to have  confirmed this. 
2.  Patent law 
The  Convent~~n for the European Patent for the  common  market  (Community 
Patent Convention)  ,  which  was  signed in 1975,  has been adduced as  a  further 
argument  in favour of the conclusion of an international treaty.  What  has 
been said with regard to trade marks  during the period from  1959 to 1964 
applies here too.  Work  wassuspended between 1965  and  1969.  When  it was 
resumed,  the choice of a  convention suggested itself mainly because the six 
then Member  States decided in 1969  to establish,  in conjunction with numerous 
non-member  States,  a  11European Patent Organization11  separate from  the European 
Community  and to confer on  it the power  to grant patents throughout Europe. 
For this purpose  a  convention was  essential. 
The  outstanding issue of the introduction of a  Community  patent was 
of concern only to the Member  States of the Community.  A separate instrument 
was  needed for this purpose.  For the historical reasons set out at l  above  and 
in view of the close affinities between both schemes,  the solution of a  convention 
was  adopted in 1969 for the Community  patent also.  The  question of the  choice 
of legal  instrument was  not raised again at that time.  The  Paris summit 
conference of the enlarged Community  was  still a  long way  off. 
Finally,  one  major.  problem l'tas  not  encountered in the field of trade 
mark  law:  there is no  need for a  pan-European trade mark  organization with  a 
pan-Eur~~ean procedure for the granting of trade marks.  The  Madrid  Agre~ent 
of 1891  already make  possible,  with the help of the World  Intellectural 
Property Organization,  the international registration and hence  the grant  of a 
"batch" of natinal trade marks  in the marjori  ty of European States.  The  Trademark 
R~gis~rat~on Trea~y of 12  ~une l~734
)which is not yet in force!  ~ill_further 
s1mph.fy 1nt·ernat1onal reg1strat1nn  •  The  only task now  rema1n1ng  l.S  the 
creation of a  autonomous,  unitary trade mark  for the territory of the Member 
States. 
For these  reasons,  the  approach adopted twenty years  ago  for the 
Community  patent and  actually retained for that purpose  does not  constitute 
a  precedent be  followed  in the case of the  Community  trade mark • 
l) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
.  .  .  / ... 
Loc.  cit., p.  16  point  51. 
OJ  No  L 17  of  26  January 1976. 
Agreement  on  the international registration of trade marks. 
Cf.,  for further details,  Commission,  Memorandum  on  the oration of an 
EEC  trade mark,  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  Supplement  8/76, 
p.  14,  points 39-43. - 54  -
It might be added that experience since gained with the ratification 
of the CoMmunity  Patent Convention has been  disappointing,  little progress 
has been made  in bringing about  the remaining conventions on  unification 
of the  law  and  the progressive enlargement  of the Community has  raised other 
difficult problems  in the field of conventions which  can hardly be.avoided. 
Such difficulties and their consequences  do  not occur in the case 
of Regulations.  The  adoption of Regulations is also much  less time-consuming. 
The  Regulation enjoys,  moreover,  a  number  of legal advantages over the  convention. 
Lastly,  its use is in keeping with the development  of the Community  and with 
political guidelines laid down  by the European Council. 
II. Ratification of multilateral conventions 
Difficulties in only one  Member  State result in a  convention entering 
into force  considerably behind schedule or not at all.  Such  difficulties 
were  experiences even when  the Community  had only six Member  States.  The 
Convention on  jurisdiction and  enf£)cement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters  (the Judgments  Convention)  did not  enter into force until nearly 
four and  a  half years after signa~,re,  and  the Protocol concerning its inter-
pretation by the Court  of Justice  came  into force after a  further two  and 
a  half years.  That makes  seven years in all.  Other conventions on  unifi-
cation of the law have  so far not entered into force.  Twelve  years have  gone 
by without ratification of the Convention on  the mutual  rec~fOition of  , 
companies  and bodies corporate  (the Recognition Convention)  by·  the Nether-
lands,  despite the fact that the other original Member  States ratified it long 
a.go. 
Since 1973  multilateral conventions have  had to surmount national 
hurdles in nine Member  States.  These  are not only of a  substantive and 
political nature,  but in two  countries are also constitutional in character. 
1.  Denmark. 
~enmark takes the view that ratification of the  Community  Patent 
Convention falls under Article  20  of its Constitution since the convention 
l) OJ  No  L  299,  31  December  1972,  p.  32 
2)  OJ  No  L 204,  2 August  1975,  p.  28 
...  ; ... 
3)  Supplement  to Bulletin No  2-1969  of the European Communities,  p.  5. - 55  -
transfers to  inernati~~al bodies powers  which in principle should be vested 
in Danish authorities  •  The  adoption of the  law ratifying the  convention 
therefore requires either a  five-sixths majority of members  of Parliament 
( 150  out  of 179  votes)  or a  simple majority and  ~referendum in which  the 
No-vote is less than  3o%  of the total electorate2J A five-sixths majority 
was  not  forthcoming in the FolkP.ting.  It was  not  considered advisable  to 
insist on  a  vote  aimed at obtaining a  simple majority and to organize  a 
plebiscite in view of the technical nature  of the issue,  the cost to the public 
and to the Government,  and the general  expense. 
If the  Community  trade mark  were  to be  created by a  convention,  Article 
20  of the  Danish Consti  tuti.on would  again apply.  In that event,  powers  vested 
in Danish authorities would  be transferred to international authorities (the 
Trade Marks  Office,  the Court  of Justice).  If,  on  the other hand,  the Council 
makes  a  Regulation,  it will be directly applicable in Denmark  also  (second 
paragraph of Article 189).  Article  20  of the Constitution will not  then 
apply.  The  Council will merely be  exercising the power,  transferred to it. 
by the Danish Act  of Accession of ll October 1972  on  the basis of Article  20 
of the Constitution and therefore no  longer vested in Danish authorities, 
to make  law within the limits of Article  235  and to transfer to the Community 
institutions and bodies powers to implement  and safeguard such  law  (see E  I  1 
above). 
.  .. I ... 
l) Article  20  (1)  provides:  "Powers  vested in the authorities of the Realm 
under this Constitutional Act  may,  to such extent as shall be  provided 
by statute,  be  delegated to internatinnal authorities set up  by mutual 
agreement with other states for the promotion of international rules of 
law  and cooperation.  11 
2)  Article  20  ( 2)  provides:  "For the  enactement of a  Bill dealing with the 
above,  a  majority of five-sixths  of the members  of the Folketing shall be 
required.  If this majority is not  obtained,  whereas  the majority required 
for the .passing of.ordinary Bills is obtained,  and if the Government  maintains 
it, the Bill shall be  submitted to the  electorate for approval  or rejection 
in accordance  with the  rules for referenda lc:.id  do11m  in section 42. 11 -56 -
2.  Ireland 
The  Irish Constitution lays11own  the principle that only Irish courts 
and  judges may  administer  justice  •  An  exception is provided for only in 
the case  of Community  lavi  and of  2
~ational laws  necessitated by the obligations 
of membership  of the Communities  •  Since the Community  Patent Convention 
was  not  adopted by Community  institutions,  the first case  does not apply. 
Whether the alternative situation obtains- an  obligation under Community 
law to ratify the  convention - appears  doubtful.  If it were ratified,  therefore, 
there would be  a  danger that Irish courts might  declare the convention 
unconstitutional. 
For these  reasons,  the entry into force  of the Community  Patent 
Convention has been pending for the past four years;  a  further long 
delay is to be  expected.  If the Community  trade mark  were  created by 
means  of a  Convention,  the  same  difficulties would arise.  The  Irish 
Government  has  repeatedly pointed this out  and  adopted the same  attitude 
towards  conventions planned in other fields.  If,  on  the  other hand,  the 
Council  adopts the proposed regulation,  the constitutional issue does not 
arise. 
III. Enlargement  of the  Community 
On  l  January 1981,  Greece will become  a  member  of the Community. 
Portugal  and Spain should follow  two  to three years later.  With  twelve 
Member  States,  of course,  th~ problems  and risks inherent in the  ratification 
of conventions will  increase considerably.  Regulations will,  as before,  stand 
a  much  better chance  of being accepted by the  Council within a  reasonable 
period.  They  enter into force  on  the twentieth day following their publication 
or on  the date  specified in them  (first paragraph of Article 191).  H  ______  _ 
Detailed statistics show  that;- from  the time work starts onfuem  until the 
(probable)  date  of their entry into force,  between fourteen  and twenty-three 
years  go  by in the  case  of conventions,  whereas  the  corresponding time-span 
in the  case of comparable  regulations or directives  (including,  moreover, 
their incorporation into national  l~~) is  usual~y ~educe~y about half. 
l) Article 34  states: "(l) Justice shall be  administered in courts established 
by law by  judges appointed in the manner provicled by this Constitution  • • •  • 
(4)  4  No  law shall be  enancted excepting from  the appellate  jurisdiction 
of the Supreme  Court  cases which involve  questions as to the validity of 
any law having regard to the provisions of this Constitution." 
2)  The  second sentence  of Article  29  (4)  3  states: "···No provision of this 
Constitution invalidates laws  enacted,  acts  done  or measures  adopted by 
the State necessitated by the obligations of membership  of the  Communities 
or prevents  laws  enacted,  acts done  or measures  adopted by the  Communities, 
or instituti.::.ns thereof,  from  having the force  of law in the State." -57-
1.  Greece 
While  it would be  possible for the  Commission,  in view of the 
present state of the discussion,  to  submit  to the  Council the proposal 
for a  regulation on  the  Community  trade mark  during the first half of 
1980,  it would be  technically and politically impossible  to  draw  up a 
convention before then and have it ready for signature by the Nine  at 
the  end of 1980  just prior to Greek  accession.  The  negotiations would 
therefore have  to be  continued or begun  in 1981  by the  Community  of 
ten Member  States.  Considerable delay would be unavoidable.  This is 
precisely what  happened in the  case of three draft conventions  "on  the 
international merger of societes anonymes"1 ),  "on  bankruptcy,  winding-up, 
arrangements,  compositions and similar proceedings" and "on  the  law  applicable 
to contractual and non-contractual obligations".  These  texts were  drawn 
up  in 1972  by the six original Member  States.  Since  1973 - i.e. for the past 
seven years - they have practically had to be renegotiated by  the enlarged 
Community. 
In contrast to this,  the proposal for a  regulation on  the  Community 
trade mark  can be  debated in the European  Parliament and the Economic  and 
Social  Committee  without  delay as from  the  Autumn  of 1980.  The  adjustments 
required as a  result of Greek  accession can be  worked out in 1981  and 
incorporated immediately in the  Commission's  proposal to the  Council  once 
it has been finalized in the light of the opinions of the consultative bodies. 
2. Portugal,  Spain 
If the  Community  trade mark  were  created by means  of a  convention and 
if the negotiations  leading up  to it were still proceeding at the moment  of 
accession to the  Community,  they would  have  to be  continued with twelve 
participants.  This would  probably lead to considerable delay,  judging by 
past  experience  (see  1  above).  If a  convention signed by the Ten  existed 
at the  time of accession,  the new  Member  States would  have  to accede  to it 
on  the basis of the Acts  concerning the  conditions of their acces,ion to the 
Community,  and what  is more  uponfueir accession to the  Community2. 
The  negotiations  concerning adjustments  to  the  Judgments  Convention 
between  the Six and Denmark,  Ireland and  the  Uhited Kingdom  lasted almost 
six years from  the moment  of accession to the  Community.  Ratification of the 
Accession ConventioQ  is currently in progress,  and it is required of all 
nine Member  States3J.  Consequently,  until it enters  into force  everywhere, 
uniform  law  will apply only in parts of the  Community  (the territory of the 
six original Member  States).  For  the past  seven years,  i.e. ever since the 
Community  was  enlarged on  1  January 1973,  it has not been possible for  the 
1)  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  Supplement  13/1973 
2)  Cf.  Article  3  offue  Act  concerning the Conditions of Accession of Denmark, 
Ireland and the  United Kingdom,  OJ  Special Edition No  L 73,  27  March  1972, 
p.  14. 
3)  Convention  of Accession of 9 October 1968  •••  to the  Convention  on  ••• , 
OJ  No  L 304,  30  October  1978. 
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convention to contribute to the functioning of the enlarged common  market 
and hence its principal objective has  been only partially attained.  When 
Greece  joins, the procedure described will recommence  in 1981.  A few  years 
later,  the  same  will happen with Portugal and Spain.  The  Convention,  which 
will hardly have  been  changed on  each occasion, will therefore have  to be 
ratified by the  Parliaments of the original Member  States at least four 
times within the  space of a  few  years.  In the case of the Recognition 
Convention,  the adjustment negotiations with Denmark,  Ireland and the  United 
Kingdom  did not  begin until the seventh year following their accession to 
the  Community. 
If a  regulation on  the  Community  trade mark  is adhered to and if it 
is adopted before the date of accession,  its effects will automatically extend 
from  then on  to the new  Member  State(s).  It will be directly applicable 
there also without further formality.  Any  necessary technical adjustments 
will be made  before accession in the course of the accession negotiations. 
More  fa~reaching amendments  are ruled out  (respect for the "acquis commautaire"). 
If accession takes  place before the regulation is adopted,  the new  Member  States 
will participate fromihe  date of accession in the  Community's  law-making procedures 
without  any stage,  to all practical purposes,  having to be repeated as in the 
case of a  convention.  The  delay that occurs will,  as past  experience would 
indicate,  be  of much  shorter duration than in the  case of a  convention. 
IV.  Characteristics of Regulations 
1. Procedure 
From  the  point of view of the procedure  involved in law-making,  a 
Regulation  has  a  certain number  of advantages  over a  convention.  They are 
explained above  (see  I  and II).  A Regulation  does not  have  to be  ratified. 
It will apply automatically in the new  Member  States from  the moment  of their 
accession.  This  means  that it would be  possible to avoid a  situation in which, 
following enlargement of the  Community,  non-uniform  laws  would  be  in operation 
for a  period of several years.  There would also be no  need to  have  long 
negotiations for the purpose of making adaptations to  a  Regulation.  A regulation 
will be more  effective and will take less time. 
The  following  par~graph sets out  a  number  of other points which 
illustrate how  a  Regulation is superior to  a  Convention.  They  are recorded 
here  in purely summary  fashion. 
2. Substantive features 
A Regulation has  the following substantive advantages  over a  conventions 
1) From  the legal point of view a  Regulation forms  part of Community  law i.e. 
it does not  apply as  international  law  in some  Member  States and as uniform 
domestic  law in others - it is autonomous  and  common  to all the Member  States. 
It has  the same  binding force  everywhere. 
2)  Geographically it applies  throughout  the whole  area of the  Community  and 
it spans  the  intra-Community frontiers of the national  legal systems  • 
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3)  It applies directly in every Member  State.  This memts  that within each 
area of national  jurisdiction no  law-making procedure is required and no 
order need be made  for application of the Regulation.  The  "directness" of 
a  Regulation makes  it similar to domestic  law  but it produces its effects 
in all the Member  States. 
4) It is uniformly applicable  in all the Member  States.  They  cannot make 
reservations about  a  Regulation or decline to apply some  part of it in their 
territory on  the  ground that  they are not  in favour  of. that part. 
5)  It cannot  be  denounced,  repealed or amended  by a  Member  State. 
6)  It receives uniform application in every Member  State. 
no  power  to refuse to  apply it in a  particular case on  the 
offends national public  policyo 
The  court  has 
ground that it 
7)  In the event  of conflict with  domestic  law,  a  Regulation takes precedence 
(priority of application). 
8)  Want  ~f reciprocity is not  a  ground for refusing to apply a  Regulation in a 
Member  State. 
3.  Legal  protection 
A Regulation has these advantages  over a  convention from  the point 
of view of the  legal protection it affords: 
1)  An  autonomous  institution of the  Community  monitors and enforces  observance 
of Regulations  by the various authorities in each Member  State.  This  ensures 
that Regulations  receive uniform application.  The  relevant  institution of 
the  Community  will take  legal proceedings,  if necessary,  to attain these  ends 
and the case will be  heard by the  Community's  own  court.  Member  States may 
also, if they wish,  take similar action and invoke  the assistance of the 
court  in order that Regulations  are actually applied. 
2)  Uniform  interpretation of a  Community  Regulation by the national courts, 
tribunals and administrative departments in the Member  States is automatically 
assured by the  Community's  Court  of Justice which gives preliminary rulings 
for the benefit of all the Member  States and their peopleso  This  produces 
consistent  judgments  in the  Member  States,  consistent case-law and uniform 
application throughout  the  Community. 
3)  The  Community's  own  Court  gives  preliminary rulings  on  questions  concerning 
the validity of Regulations where  this has been  put in issue before national 
courts.  This not only ensures  the uniform validity (or the uniform  invalidity) 
of Regulations  in the whole  Community,  it also enables private individuals 
to take action so  that  Community  law  is observed by national and  Community 
institutions alike. -~-
4) The  legality of a  Regulation and,  therefore,  the legality of acts of  r 
the  Council and  Commission  are supervised by the  Community's  own  Court. 
Proceedings may  be  brought therein by Member  States,  Council  and Commission. 
Observance  of Community  law and particularly of the EEC  Treaty with its 
legal and institutional guarantees,  is further  ensured by these means. 
v.  Conclusions 
Thanks  to  the  Regulation the  Community  has available an  instrument 
whereby truly uniform  law can be  introduced and which  from  several points 
of view  (namely the  likelihood of its entering into force,  duration of the 
law-making procedure,  kind of procedure,  legal characteristics and effects 
of a  Regulation,  and the application thereof) is very much  superior to  inte~ 
state conventions between the Member  States of the  Community.  It is perfectly 
suited to  the needs.of a  common  market  in products marketed under trade marks. 
Jdrectives harmonising national  laws  onirade marks  inevitably leave gaps  in 
the arrangements for free movement  of marked goods  and services and for 
undistorted competition.  Regulations  can fill those gaps  admirably.  They 
are as consistent  and  effective as domestic  law,  but,  of course,  they operate 
at  Community  level;  this relieves them  from  being tied to a  specific national 
area of jurisdiction and distinguishes them  from  domestic  law. 
The  Community,  of course,  has  institutions and use must  be  made  of 
them  for purposes  offue European  trade mark  system.  With its present 
institutions for  law-making,  execution of policy and determination of cases 
at  law,  the  Community  offers a  flexible framework  into which  the European 
trade mark  system and the Trade Marks  Office  can fit quite easily.  It is 
neither necessary nor desirable to  create a  new  international organisation 
for this  purpose.  One  does better to  remember  what  Mr.  Leo  Tindemans,  Prime 
Minist~r of Belgium,  said to the European  Council  in his report on  European 
Union1lz  "In building Europe  the  general tendency towards  administrative 
decentralisation in all our countries must  always be borne  in mind.  The 
institutions of the Union must  be at pains to establish specialised executive 
agencies,  as  the need arises,  to carry out particular tasks.  Common  agencies 
of this kind will have  to have  flexible  constitutions which  enable  them  to 
be run individually,  but  responsible,  under the guidance of the institutions." 
The  European  Council  "shared the views  expressed by the Prime  Minister of Belgium 
concerning the need ••••• to give  the Union,  ~tep.by step,  the instruments  and 
institutions it needs  in order to progress".2J  The  establishment of a  Community 
Trade Marks  Office by  Council Regulation fits this political prospect. 
1)  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  Supplement  1/76,  p.  34  (point 5). 
2)  European  Council meeting,  29  and  30  November  1976 at the  Hague;  President's 
conclusions,  SI(76)  870/2,  Po5  (point 4,  paragraph 2). 
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The  same  is to be  said about  basing the Regulation  on  Article 235. 
Under  the heading "StrengthenPtg of the institutions",  the nine  Heads  of 
State or Government  declared:1J ·~hat they were  agreed that  •••• all the 
provisions of the Treaties  should be  used,  including Article 235  of the EEC 
Treaty". 
This has been  done  since 1973  onwards.  The  Council  has  utilised 
Article 235  in adopting legislation in the following fields amongst  others: 
customs  union,  external trade,  agriculture  (including the setting up of a 
common  policy on  fisheries),  vocational training and the right to carry on 
the vocation,  recognition of qualifications,  equality of the  sexes  in 
relation to  employment,  occupational training and development,  social 
security,  right of residence,  protection of the  environment  (including 
bird conservation),  consumer  protection,  energy,  budgetary matters 
(correcting mechanism),  currencies,  setting up  of the European  Monetary 
Fund,  creation and management  of the ECU,  lending by the  Commlllli ty,  loans 
to Member  States to promote monetary stability,  loans for the  promotion of 
investment  in the Community,  the European  Regional Development  Fund,  creation 
of a  system of Community aid for undertakings in the data processing industry, 
Community aid for regions  damaged  by earthquakes,  creation of a  European  Centre 
for the  development  of vocational training,  creation of a  European Foundation 
for the improvement  of living and working conditions,  exchange  of workers, 
the fight against poverty,  promotion of research,  development  and technology 
in various industries,  creation of an  information and documentation network. 
At  1  October 1979  the number  of texts adopted under Article 235  was  in the 
vicinity of 190. 
Although the foregoing texts based solely on  Article 235  relate 
mostly to topics  or policies 1-rhich  are  "peripheral",  the  Draft Regulation on 
the  Community  trade mark  goes  to the very heart of the  Community's  task,  namely 
the creation of the  common  market  (Article 2).  A number  of essential activities 
a:reinvolved which  expressly form  part of the Community's  "activities" (Article 3), 
viz.the removal  of obstacles to the free movement  of goods  and services,  and the 
creation of conditions of undistorted competition.  The  matter is thus not 
merely marginal;  it is fundamental.  This is why  the draft in its scope  and 
conception as a  piece of  Communit~)action is fully consonant with  the guidelines 
laid down  by  the European  Council  :  "The  European  Council is agreed that 
the safeguarding and development  of the  Common  Market  by further measures 
to  remove  trade barriers and distortions of competition are a  permanent 
task of the  Community". 
1)  Point  15  of the final declaration of the Summit  Conference,  18  and  19 
October  1972  in Paris,  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  No.  10-1972, 
p.24. 
2)  European  Council,  6  and 7  July 1978  in Bremen,  President's conclusions, 
P•  7  (point  1 .6). - 62-
It should be noted that the  Community  trade mark  is being created 
for the purpose of completing and supplementing one  of the other basic tasks 
expressly given to the  Community  namely the approximation  of national 
laws  (Article  3,  paragraph h).  Article 235  is used as the legal basis  in so 
far only as  the Directive whose  adoption is provided for by Article 100  for 
the purpose  of harmonising those provisions of trade mark  law  which  impede 
intra-Community trade and competition is inadequate to set up  a  common  market 
in marked  products.  Thus  the  Regulation is not  a  substitute for harmonisation 
of law  by  means  of a  Directive under Article 100,  nor for the national  laws 
on  trade marks;  it supplements  both of them  in relation to a  matter which 
is vital in the EEC  Treaty,  namely the creation of a  European  internal market 
for goods  and  services marketed under trade marks.  By  definition,  only the 
Community  trade mark  fits the  common  market  exactly.  It is a  positive and 
essential adjunct thereto. 
The  fact that the trade mark  law  contained in the draft Regulation 
consists,  like all trade mark  laws,  of a  complex  of substantive,  procedural 
and administrative rules does not  in ~y  way  affect the  competence  of the 
Community  or that of its institutions.  There  is no  question here of severable 
competence.  It is purely and  s~ply a  matter of the Council's  exercising 
its tmdivided power  to take all "appropriate measures" to attain the above-
mentioned objectives of the  Community. 
As  Article 235  attracts the unanimity rule the interests of every 
one  of the Member  States are covered.  On  this very important  point there is 
nothing to differentiate a  Community  text of law  from  a  convention. 
The  Court  of Justice has,  drawn  the attention of the Heads  of State 
or of Government  to a  somewhat  serious result which would flow from  their 
declining to use  Article 235  for  the purpose of creating new  law.  Under 
the heading "Tbe  essentials for legislating effectively" the Court  of Justice 
observes that1J:  "If,  consistently with the EEC  Treaty,  Article 235  were 
to be  used,  Community  law  could develop by means  of a  gradual  expansion of 
its scope  of application •••• But  if,  on  the contrary,  some  other procedure 
were  to be  used which was  merely international in character (by whateve·r  name 
it were  known)  Community  law  oould be in danger of becoming sterile and of 
having no  prospect of development". 
The  European  Parliament is awaiting the proposal for a  Regulation 
with great interest.  It has  asked the  Commission  to present the text 
to it as soon  as  possib~~ and has  expressed its satisfaction with the 
Commission's  initiative  J.  The  Commission  has  infotmed Parliament that 
its proposal will be  ready at the beginning of 19803). 
1)  Suggestions of the  Court 
European  Union,  Bulletin 
p.  17(19). 
of Justice on  European  Union,  see:  Reports  on 
of the European  Communities,  Supplement  9/75, 
2)  Resolution of 13  October 1979,  OJ  Nq  C261,  6.11.78,  p.49  (point 7) and 
the report of Member  of Parliament Damseaux  on  the  subject,  European 
Parliament,  Working  Papers  1978-1979,  document  334/78 of 5  October  1978, 
p.12,  and Debates  of the European  Parliament,  Annex  OJ  No  234,  October 1978, 
P•  253. 
3)  See  Debates  of the European  Parliament above-mentioned,  and  replies to 
written questions No  501/78,  OJ  No  C 287,  30.11.78,  p.13,  and No.  548/78, 
OJ  No  C 257,  30.10.78,  p.13.  .;. - 63-
In its resolutions,  debates  and reports the European  Parliament has 
repeatedly stressed that the  Commission  and  the  Coun~il are bound  to use  Article 
235  where  the conditions contained therein are met.1J It is only then that 
Parliament can exercise its right to be  consulted and to  express an opinion, 
and,  by proposing amendments,  to play its democratic role in the process of 
making European  law.  Just as Parliament  did,  the  Commission  pointed out  in 
its Memorandum  of 1976 that both the  Council and the  Commission  are under 
obligation to use  Article 235  in creating a  European  tr~de mark  system if 
the conditions specified in that Article are satisfied2J:  "The  EEC  Treaty 
provides  that the objectives of the  Community  specified therein are to 
be attained by the use of powers  conferred by the Treaty on  the  Community 
institutions.  o ••• Article 235  of the Treaty •••••  · states that  •••••  the  Council 
shall, acting unanimously on  a  proposal from  the Commission  and after consulting 
the  Assembly,  take the appropriate measures.n 
Since  1979,  Parliament  has  consisted of members  who  are directly elected 
by the citizens of the  Common  Market.  This  lends  special significance to the 
obligation quoted above  and to parliamentary involvement,  which is requisite 
under Article 235.  The  combination of these factors will strengthen democratic 
control of the  law-making process  in the Community  and make  it easier, not least 
from  the political point of view,  to  use  Article 235  for the purpose of setting 
up a  European System  of trade marks. 
Only if Article 235  is used will it be possible for Parliament  and 
the Council,  as budgetary authority,  and the Court of Auditors,  as control 
body,  to exercise both direct democratic control and  independent  official 
control over the budget of the proposed Trade Marks  Office. 
1)  Member  of Parliament  Tindemans,  speaking for the European  People's Party 
at the first session of the new  Parliament after its members  had been 
elected for the first time by direct vote of the electorate,  expressed 
the hope  that the fullest possible use would be made  of Article 235. 
2)  Memorandum  on  the creation of an  EEC  trade mark,  Bulletin of the European 
Communities,  Supplement  8/76,  PP•  14-15  (points 44  and 47). 